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 Introduction 
 
Fiscal decentralization, that is, the allocation of tax and spending powers to lower levels 
of government, is now an established policy objective in many developed and 
developing countries. It is also actively promoted as a development strategy by 
organisations such as the World Bank (Azfar et al., 2001; World Bank, 2000). From the 
USA to China, and across Europe, increasing the transfer of resources and powers to 
subnational tiers of governments has been justified as a means of improving economic 
performance (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). For developed countries, the index of 
regional authority computed by Hooghe et al. (2010) for 42 democracies and semi-
democracies reveals that 70% of countries have decentralised since 1950. In light of this 
trend, there is increased need to understand the impact of fiscal decentralization in a 
country. The main question to be answered is whether it is advantageous to give sub-
national governments more authority and autonomy in revenue and expenditure 
decisions, or whether such issues are better decided at the central level of government.  
This trend towards decentralization has stimulated investigation into its effects in 
several areas, such as economic growth (Baskaran and Feld, 2013; Rodriguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra, 2011); regional disparities (Lessmann, 2009; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2011); interpersonal inequality and poverty (Sepúlveda and Martínez-Vázquez, 2011; 
Tselios et al., 2012); government quality (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Kyriacou 
and Roca-Sagalés, 2011); civil conflict and terrorism (Dreher and Fischer, 2010; 
Ezcurra, 2015). 
This thesis focuses on two issues that have received only minor attention in the 
literature on the effects of decentralization. From an economic perspective, the 
advantages of decentralization typically cited in the literature (Azfar et al., 2001; 
Lockwood, 2006; Oates, 1999) can be summed up as follows. First, decentralization is 
claimed to improve allocative efficiency, in the sense that the goods provided by local 
governments will be better matched to the preferences of the local population. This is 
sometimes known as the preference matching argument. Second, decentralization is 
argued to lead to more efficient delivery of government services. In this literature, 
production efficiency is interpreted broadly to accommodate inefficiencies such as 
corruption, waste, and poor governance. There is now quite a large literature on 
 
 
9 
 
 
decentralization and allocative efficiency. There is, in contrast, no literature focusing on 
decentralization and productive inefficiency. The lack of empirical research is 
surprising considering that economic efficiency is the central argument for fiscal 
decentralization, while the arguments against it revolve around its potential negative 
impact on resource distribution and macroeconomic stability. The first chapter of the 
thesis attempts to fill this gap by examining the effects of fiscal decentralization on 
technical efficiency in several OECD countries.  
Chapter 1 provides evidence on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
technical efficiency. There are, to the best of our knowledge, no studies addressing the 
subject of technical efficiency as a key aspect of the potential impact of 
decentralization. It is therefore an original contribution, since it evaluates the effects of 
fiscal decentralization on technical efficiency not by examining government or public 
sector performance, but by examining technical efficiency in the economic activity of 
the country as a whole. The first stage of this study begins with a Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) to obtain technical efficiency estimates for a sample of 23 Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 1992 
to 2009. A second stage explores the effects of fiscal decentralization and other control 
variables on technical efficiency. Considering all the control variables, the results reveal 
a statistically significant negative relationship between fiscal decentralization of public 
expenditure and technical efficiency. 
The second chapter of the thesis studies the effects of decentralization on shadow 
economy. The prediction of the theoretical analysis is that there is less shadow economy 
in federal countries than in unitary states (Teobaldelli, 2011). The argument is that 
competition among local governments and the mobility of agents induce politicians in 
these jurisdictions to adopt fiscal policies that are closer to the social optimum than 
those implemented in a centralised economy. In particular, federal system policies are 
characterised by lower taxation, better provision of productive services, and lower rents 
to politicians. In turn, more efficient fiscal policy increases the net marginal 
productivity of labour in the formal sector and reduces the incentive of individuals to 
operate in the shadow economy. For similar reasons, countries whose policy makers are 
relatively more insulated from outside interests are more likely to be characterised by a 
larger informal sector. 
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Chapter two of the thesis is aimed at providing empirical evidence on the various 
effects of decentralization on the size of the shadow economy. The study employs an 
econometric model with panel data for a sample of 23 OECD countries over the period 
1999 to 2009 and indicators of fiscal decentralization of expenditure and revenue. A 
second stage explores the effects of fiscal decentralization on shadow economy using 
disaggregated expenditure data (education, health and social protection).  The results 
reveal a statistically significant negative relationship between fiscal decentralization of 
public expenditure and shadow economy. The same is found for decentralization of 
expenditure in education and social protection, which negatively affects shadow 
economy. The findings suggest that fiscal decentralization is an appropriate instrument 
for reducing shadow economy. These results are consistent with previous findings in the 
literature (Feld and Frey, 2002; Torgler, 2005a and Torgler, 2005b). 
Little research has been done so far on the economic performance of the regions in 
decentralized countries. This study can contribute to this strand of the literature by 
studying the resilience of Spanish regions. Spain is a good example of a decentralized 
country where recent decades have seen a variety of regional growth patterns. This 
makes it a perfect candidate for this analysis.   
Importantly, most existing analyses of regional resilience focus on the role played by 
the composition of the productive structure and the degree of specialisation (i.e, 
Cuadrado-Roura and Maroto, 2016; Martin et al.,2016), thereby overlooking other 
potential factors that may affect the behaviour of regions in the context of an economic 
crisis. The reason behind this trend might be that in biological and ecological research, 
diversity has been argued to play a key role in influencing developmental robustness 
(see Jones et al., 2004 or Matilla and Seeley, 2007). Following this natural analogy, the 
focus in economic resilience studies has been on testing whether 
diversification/specialisation of the industry mix increases economic robustness. 
However, there are several factors, not specific to the labour market or the diversity and 
composition of the productive structure, such as social, human or public capital, for 
example, that could significantly affect a region's resilience. These variables are 
included in the analysis of Spanish regional resilience described in chapter three. 
Chapter three of the thesis analyzes the characteristics that most influence the 
resilience of a region. The analysis begins with the construction of a new composite 
index of resilience for the 17 regions of Spain in the different periods of recession and 
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recovery from 1980 to 2015. The DEA approach is used to obtain this new index. A 
second stage analyses the factors that could contribute to regional resilience. The 
regions were characterised by means of multiple factor analysis, chosen for its strong 
potential for defining homogeneous groups of objects, or, in this case, regions. 
Variables were selected to determine regional recovery capacity. Differences between 
the new index of resilience and that of Martin (2012) are also analysed. The findings 
suggest that regions with productive structures focused on market services show a 
higher index of resilience in periods of recovery, whereas those focused on industry are 
more resilient in periods of crisis. Thus, the resilience of the Spanish regions varies 
according to their productive structures and specialisation. 
 The thesis concludes by suggesting several lines for future research on the topics of 
decentralization and regional resilience. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Does decentralization contribute to efficiency? 
Evidence from OECD countries  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Decentralization has become a relevant topic in recent decades and its economic impact 
has given rise to intense debate. This problem is an open, ongoing process affecting 
many countries; viz., Spain‘s 1978 Constitution or Italy‘s constitutional reforms of 
2001. Decentralization means the transfer of power and responsibility for public affairs 
from the central government to regional and local governments.  
Calls for the decentralization of power and the granting of subnational autonomy 
were historically centred on cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious arguments. Central 
to this discourse was the value of preserving and promoting cultural and ethnic identity, 
as reflected in subnational differences in lifestyle and modes of interaction. But 
decentralization is motivated by quite different reasons. In the past several decades, a 
large number of unitary countries have sought decentralization as means of searching 
for a more efficient and leaner public sector. Other countries became disenchanted with 
the performance of former planning and centralized policies. Indeed, fiscal 
decentralization deals with how the public sector is organized and how to create 
opportunities for higher growth and welfare. Decentralization governance can restore 
confidence in public policies and provide a basis for broader policy consensus. On the 
other hand, some decentralization movements are designed to contain centrifugal forces, 
ethnic conflicts, and/or separatist movements, and to smooth out social and political 
tensions by means of allowing more local autonomy. In some cases there may even be 
some political opportunism using decentralization for merely electoral objectives 
(Martínez-Vazquez, et al., 2015).  However, the thrust of the discourse has shifted from 
decentralization as a means to preserve local uniqueness to decentralization as a way to 
adapt to, and therefore embrace, economic globalization (Rodríguez Pose and Gill, 
2005). 
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It has often been suggested, moreover, that decentralization is a means to achieve 
economic growth or reduce regional inequality, and there has been much discussion 
about its relationship to these and its role in explaining corruption. Thus, we are as 
likely to hear arguments for it as against it. There is, however, little research directly 
focused on the impact of fiscal decentralization on technical efficiency. Some studies 
have addressed efficiency in specific areas of public services, such as health or 
education (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; Letelier, 2011) or public sector efficiency as 
a whole (Adam et al., 2014), but, as far as we know, none has analyzed the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on overall economic efficiency. Efficiency is key to a country‘s 
ability to avoid waste by using as few inputs as output production allows, or by 
producing as much output as input usage allows. In other words, the best possible use of 
scant resources is vital to maximize production for the population.  
The aim of this paper is to fill a gap in the existing literature by furthering the study 
of fiscal decentralization, which is the type of decentralization on which most papers 
have focused to date, and by examining its impact on technical efficiency. We consider 
this a worthwhile topic of research, because technical efficiency is essential if a country 
is to make the most of its available resources.  Thus, we begin the first stage of this 
study with a DEA to obtain technical efficiency estimates for a sample of 23 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries over the 
period 1992 to 2009. In a second stage, we explore the effects of fiscal decentralization 
and other control variables on technical efficiency. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two summarizes the theoretical 
arguments for and against the existence of a relationship between decentralization and 
technical efficiency.  Section three describes the tools used to measure technical 
efficiency and fiscal decentralization. Section four provides details of the estimated 
model and presents the results. The final section presents the main conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Decentralization and efficiency 
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There are, to the best of our knowledge, no studies addressing the subject of technical 
efficiency as a key aspect of the potential impact of decentralization. This paper is 
therefore an original contribution, since it evaluates the effects of fiscal decentralization 
on technical efficiency not by examining government or public sector performance, but 
by examining technical efficiency in the activity of a country as a whole. 
The notion of fiscal decentralization as a means to increase technical efficiency is 
based on the fiscal federalism theory, which originated in seminal papers by Tiebout 
(1956), Musgrave (1959), Oates (1972) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980). The said 
authors argue that fiscal decentralization can increase technical efficiency in several 
ways: by bringing government closer to the preferences of citizens; by promoting 
governmental accountability; and by increasing competition between jurisdictions. 
Oates (1972) specifically argues in his ―decentralization theorem‖ that local 
governments are better able to match the allocation of public goods to local needs and 
preferences, and thus provide a better level of social welfare than is possible through 
centralized resource allocation. The underlying assumption is that different jurisdictions 
will have different needs and preferences and that these should be met by distributing 
public resources accordingly. A centralized government may be unaware of or ill-
informed about regional and local needs and opt for uniform provision of public goods. 
The same bundle of goods will not necessarily suit all people, however. Oates (1972) 
argues further that centralization proves costly if the government has to provide 
different sets of public goods to meet public preferences in each jurisdiction. If 
preferences vary geographically, uniform provision of public goods by central 
governments will force some local populations to accept a larger or smaller amount of 
goods and services than they find desirable. Moreover, Oates´s (1972) theorem predicts 
a greater efficiency of decentralized service delivery in terms of allocative efficiency, 
which is using available resources to better match taxpayers´preferences and needs. A 
direct test of this is hard to do and actually has never been performed
1
.  
                                                     
1
 The ultimate test for the efficiency effects of decentralization would be to be able to observe increases in 
the utility of taxpayers following decentralization and having expanded the budget. However, there have 
been over the years a number of indirect tests performed for the greater efficiency of decentralized 
delivery, such as those related to the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis reflecting the greater variety and 
heterogeneity of services under decentralized settings, taxpayers mobility across jurisdictions, and 
possibly the capitalization of differential efficiencies into house values. 
 
 
17 
 
 
A second concept of efficiency is that of production efficiency, or delivering a 
particular bundle of public services at a minimum cost. Being able to produce and 
deliver public services at a lower cost should translate into an increased quality and 
quantity of the services. Considering these changes represents a main alternative avenue 
for testing the efficiency effects of decentralization. Since education and health are 
among the most important types of decentralized services (OECD, 2013), a lot of the 
empirical literature has focused on those two areas. 
Tiebout (1956) and Musgrave (1959) argue in favour of fiscal decentralization as a 
means to achieve more efficient distribution of public resources, greater awareness of 
the real preferences of the local population and better adjustment of public policies in 
order to satisfy them. 
With greater autonomy and more funds at their disposal, regional governments have 
no choice but to address the needs of their population using their own resources, instead 
of expecting a solution in the form of public goods or services from a central 
government that is further removed from and less aware of local needs and preferences. 
This leads to greater economic efficiency at regional and local level throughout the 
entire country and to better use of resources that might otherwise be wasted (Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). 
Another argument in favour of fiscal decentralization is that it results in better 
governance, since proximity to the population places constraints on activities such as 
the diversion of public funds, favouritism towards particular interest groups, and the 
shirking of responsibilities, all of which would have a negative impact on a country‘s 
technical efficiency (Hindriks and Lockwood, 2009).  
Fiscal decentralization also improves efficiency through so-called ―yardstick 
competition‖ or competition among jurisdictions (Tiebout, 1956; Shleifer, 1985; 
Prud‘homme, 1995; Donahue, 1997; Martínez-Vázquez and McNab, 2003). Faced with 
the risk that some individual voters or firms might be tempted to ―vote with their feet‖ 
and move to another jurisdiction, local governments tend to compete to design better 
and more efficient policies (Tiebout, 1956; Donahue, 1997; Martínez-Vázquez and 
McNab, 2003). Residents have the advantage of being able to measure the outcome of 
local government policies and the performance of public employees by comparing 
service provision and taxation in their own with those in neighbouring jurisdictions and 
judge whether public resources are being wasted (Besley and Smart, 2007). Indeed, free 
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movement of the population and competition among jurisdictions force local 
governments to clamp down on any inefficiency, rent-seeking behaviour or corrupt 
practices (Breton, 1996). Competition also encourages innovation, because the most 
successful local policies can be transferred from one region to another, thereby 
generating significant technical efficiency gains (Donahue, 1997).  
Although the arguments described so far revolve around the idea that fiscal 
decentralization results in increased technical efficiency, there is no empirical proof of 
the fact. Indeed, not all of the arguments are in favour. Fiscal decentralization can have 
a negative impact on technical efficiency, as argued by authors such as Prud‘homme, 
(1995) and Stein (1997). This negative impact may be due to the number of potential 
advantages that central governments obtain from the provision of public goods.  In the 
presence of economies of scale, further decentralization makes the production and 
distribution of public goods more costly (Stein, 1997). In addition, local and regional 
governments are often too small to deliver public goods and services efficiently 
(Prud‘homme, 1995). There are probably more advantages to centralized distribution in 
the case of capital-intensive goods, where mass investment is needed to reduce unit 
distribution costs (Frenkel, 1986). 
Prud‘homme (1995) argues that basic needs, such as food, education, security, 
health, infrastructure and other services, are universal, varying little from one region to 
another, and can therefore be better provided by a central government. Even if cross-
regional variation is acknowledged, however, regional governments may still lack the 
capacity to take full advantage of fiscal autonomy (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2006). 
Indeed, as far as we are aware, there is no empirical evidence to prove that local or 
regional governments show any real superiority when it comes to identifying the needs 
and preferences of each jurisdiction (Prud‘homme, 1995). 
Another problem with regional governments is the increased danger of their falling 
prey to corrupt practices or pressure from lobbies: two further impediments to technical 
efficiency (Prud‘homme, 1995). Local governments can easily become the victims of 
manoeuvring by elites or lobbies (Inman and Rubinfeld, 2000; Storper, 2005) and thus 
more vulnerable to corruption, nepotism and clientelism. Tanzi (1995) also believes that 
corruption is more common at local than at national level, particularly in developing 
countries.  
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As already noted, there is no empirical evidence regarding the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on technical efficiency in countries. More research has gone into 
exploring the relationship between decentralization and economic growth, because it is 
more challenging to measure a country‘s efficiency than it is to estimate its economic 
growth by its GDP. 
Most research on decentralization and growth is based on the premise that the 
transfer of resources to lower levels of government influences growth via the impact on 
resource allocation (Martínez-Vázquez and McNab, 2003). In other words, greater 
autonomy leads to greater efficiency, greater satisfaction among the population and 
ultimately to greater growth. Despite all the empirical literature on this topic, however, 
the findings are inconclusive. Some studies report a negative relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 1998), 
while others find the link to be positive (Lin and Liu, 2000; Akai and Sakata, 2002; 
Iimi, 2005) or even non-existent (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and Phillips, 1998). 
ThieBen (2003), meanwhile, describes the relationship as inverted U-shaped, that is, an 
increase in fiscal decentralization brings about an increase in economic growth, but only 
up to a certain point, beyond which the relationship changes direction, and economic 
growth declines as fiscal decentralization increases. Blöchliger and Égert (2013) 
analyze the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic activity. Based on 
a set of growth regressions, the results suggest that the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and GDP per capita, productivity or human capital is positive and 
statistically significant. Moreover, they find that the relationship between 
decentralisation and GDP appears to be non-linear, revealing decreasing returns of 
decentralisation. Feld and Schnellendach (2011) also said that theory suggests various 
counteracting effects in the relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth. 
And it does not give a clear-cut prediction on which of the effects will dominate the 
others. Essentially, the net effect of fiscal federalism on growth is an empirical issue. 
Sobel et al. (2013) suggest in their paper that greater decentralization probably improves 
growth because it results in government policies more conducive to entrepreneurship 
and business success. They test and confirm this hypothesis using several business 
climate measures for the U.S. states. Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2009) find that, contrary to 
expectations that fiscal decentralization is likely to have a positive effect on government 
efficiency and economic growth, decentralization has coincided in the sample countries 
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with a relative increase in current expenditures at the expense of capital expenditures, 
which has been associated with lower levels of economic growth in countries where 
devolution has been driven from above (India and Mexico), but not in Spain, where it 
has been drive from below. 
 The question left begging, however, is what circumstances accompany such a 
phenomenon. In this paper, we aim to provide some answers by examining the 
arguments both for and against the impact of decentralization on efficiency and to 
obtain some conclusive findings regarding this relationship by conducting an empirical 
analysis. 
 
1.3 Measuring technical efficiency and decentralization  
 
In this section, we describe our choice of instruments to measure technical efficiency 
and decentralization. We first define what we mean by technical efficiency and then 
describe the DEA method we will use to calculate it. 
Technical efficiency occurs when maximum output is obtained from a given input 
level, or minimum input is used to obtain a given output level. Technical efficiency 
analysis can therefore have an output-maximization orientation or an input-
minimization orientation. The objective with the former is to calculate the maximum 
increase in output that can be achieved without changing the level of input, while that of 
the latter is to obtain a given level of output with the minimum amount of input. 
Building on a previous study by Debreu (1951), Farrell (1957) introduces a measure 
of technical efficiency, which he defines (p. 254) as: ―one minus the equi-proportional 
reduction in all inputs that still allows the production of given outputs‖. A decision 
making unit (DMU) that obtains a score of one is said to be technically efficient when it 
is impossible for it to achieve an equiproportional reduction in input while obtaining a 
given level of output. A score of less than one indicates technical inefficiency. 
Farrell‘s method for technical efficiency analysis was generalized for multi-output 
contexts and reformulated by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) as a mathematical 
programming problem, later termed DEA, which is the approach to be used in this paper 
to obtain efficiency estimates for the sample countries. 
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In DEA, mathematical programming techniques are applied to the observed data in 
order to estimate production frontiers with which to evaluate the efficiency of each 
production unit. Two of the main advantages of this approach are that there is no need 
to specify a parametric form for the production function, and that it can be used in 
multi-output contexts. It does, however, have its drawbacks in that the frontier is 
calculated from a set of observations and is therefore sensitive to data-measurement 
errors and outliers, and that the non-statistical nature of the approach makes it 
impossible to draw statistical inferences from the results. Nevertheless, DEA is very 
widely used to estimate production frontiers, as can be appreciated from the existing 
literature (Charnes and Neralic, 1990; Seiford and Zhu, 1998; Afonso and St. Aubyn, 
2006; Rayp and Van De Sijpe, 2007). 
In this analysis, the performance of each DMU is measured relative to an 
envelopment surface composed of other DMUs from the sample representing current 
technology. Those DMUs that are enveloped by the surface are classed as efficient; 
while those outside it are classed as inefficient. The closer the DMU is to the border, the 
greater its efficiency. 
Technical efficiency is measured in terms of the maximum proportional reduction in 
all inputs that is possible keeping output constant, but it can also be calculated as the 
maximum proportional increase in output that is possible keeping all inputs constant. 
Both measures provide the same results under constant returns to scale, but not under 
variable returns to scale. This study is maximum-output-oriented under variable returns 
to scale. The justification for adopting an output orientation is that a country will aim to 
produce the maximum quantity of goods and services from its available resources. The 
assumption of variable returns to scale implies that each production unit has the 
optimum operating level for its input and output structure, and thus ensures that the 
model will evaluate pure technical efficiency, irrespective of scale considerations. 
Thus, the output-maximization-oriented model assuming variable returns to scale can 
be written as follows:  
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using ( 1,2,... )i i n   and 0 0( )i   as the efficiency index for each unit, with constrained 
input/output. This measure satisfies that 01   , and 0 1   is the maximum 
proportional increase in outputs that is possible using the same quantity of inputs. The 
01/  index defines the technical efficiency level, which ranges between 0 and 1.  
The variables in this problem include i  weights on the n  DMUs, which enable the 
construction of a composite unit producing 
n
ri i
i n
y 

  of output ( 1,... )r r k , which is 
greater than or equal to the amount produced by unit 0i .  
The technical efficiency of the sample countries is calculated from the usual 
variables found in the literature (Maudos et al., 2000; Puig-Junoy, 2001; Ezcurra et al., 
2009): GDP for output; and number of employed, and physical and human capital stock 
as inputs
2
. 
These variables are examined in a sample of 23 OECD countries for the period 1992 
to 2009. There are several reasons for this choice of study sample. One, already noted, 
is that the second stage of the analysis focuses on the way decentralization affects 
efficiency and the sample is therefore constrained by the availability of decentralization 
data. Another is that the relative homogeneity of development levels OECD countries 
means that this choice of sample, which is no novelty in the published research on 
decentralization and growth (Thießen, 2003; Thornton, 2007; Baskaran and Feld, 2013), 
avoids the problem of having to compare countries with very different levels of 
development. Advanced economies show a marked tendency towards convergence in 
                                                     
2
 Details of the variables are given in the table A1.1 in the appendix. 
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terms of aggregate productivity, technology growth, and per capita income (Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). This economic convergence, that is, the reduction in economic 
differences between OECD countries along with similar growth dynamics, is also useful 
in correcting any potential bias due to omitted variables. 
Table 1.1 shows the average technical efficiency scores of the 23 OECD sample 
countries assuming variable returns to scale over the period 1992-2009
3
. Countries with 
a score of one are technically efficient, that is, they lie on the production frontier. In this 
case, 6 of the 23 countries qualify as technically efficient: Iceland, Luxembourg, 
Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. These results are 
consistent with those of other studies (Henderson and Russell, 2005). There are also 
some, such as Italy, Norway or France, which score less than, but very close to, 1 
(0.974, 0.964 and 0.952, respectively). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3
 Table A1.2 in the appendix shows the technical efficiency scores for the same countries under constant 
returns to scale. Here, only one country (Luxembourg) has a score of 1, in contrast to the results under 
variable returns to scale where there were 6 technically-efficient countries. Despite scoring less than 1 
under constant returns, the majority of the previous six countries (USA, Poland, and UK) come very 
close. 
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Table 1.1: Technical efficiency scores for OECD countries, 1992-2009 
 
Having defined and calculated technically efficiency for the sample countries, we 
now define the concept of fiscal decentralization, describe how it is measured, and 
mention some cross-country differences.  
Much power over public decision-making has, in recent times, been handed over 
from central governments with jurisdiction over the whole country to lower (regional 
and/or local) tiers of government. The concept of decentralization the term used to 
describe this transfer of power is complex and takes different forms: fiscal, political or 
administrative; each with its own characteristics and political implications. 
This paper focuses on fiscal decentralization, that is, the delegation of powers of 
expenditure and taxation to lower levels of government, using two standard measures: 
subnational share of total public expenditure and subnational share of total government 
Variable returns to scale Mean Standard deviation Ranking
Australia 0.761 0.031 15
Austria 0.838 0.017 12
Belgium 0.887 0.027 8
Canada 0.849 0.035 10
Denmark 0.914 0.020 7
Finland 0.808 0.025 13
France 0.952 0.050 4
Germany 0.923 0.127 6
Hungary 0.626 0.049 18
Iceland 1.000 0.000 1
Ireland 0.936 0.087 5
Italy 0.974 0.054 2
Luxembourg 1.000 0.000 1
Mexico 0.848 0.033 11
Netherlands 0.781 0.023 14
Norway 0.964 0.070 3
Poland 1.000 0.000 1
Portugal 0.663 0.023 17
Spain 0.737 0.057 16
Sweden 0.867 0.023 9
Switzerland 1.000 0.000 1
United Kingdom 1.000 0.000 1
United States 1.000 0.000 1
Mean 0.884 0.033
Source: authors‘ own calculations
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tax revenue (e.g., Oates, 1985, 1993; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and Phillips, 
1998; Thieben, 2003; Iimi, 2005). 
 
Table 1.2: Fiscal decentralization in OECD countries, 1992-2009 
 
As can be seen from Table 1.2, the OECD countries included in the sample show 
significant variation in their degree of fiscal decentralization, both in expenditure and 
tax revenue terms. The most decentralized in terms of expenditure are Switzerland, 
Germany and Canada (all federal states) with Portugal, Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom at the lower end of the scale. Although fiscal decentralization is on the rise in 
most countries, the average increase is only 2.73% (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011), 
due to steep declines by countries such as Poland, Finland and Norway (-34.38%, -
13.56%, and -13.23%, respectively). In terms of the decentralization of revenue, there is 
a 66% gap between the most decentralized (Switzerland) and the least decentralized 
country (Portugal). Decentralization of revenue is growing at a higher rate overall 
(average, 8.06%) than that of expenditure. The highest rate of increasing 
Decentralization
Country Mean St. Dev. Δ (%) Ranking Mean St. Dev. Δ (%) Ranking
Australia 0.383 0.018 1.44% 12 0.398 0.018 -1.39% 14
Austria 0.419 0.016 4.46% 11 0.453 0.027 -0.18% 10
Belgium 0.448 0.028 6.35% 8 0.464 0.019 1.45% 8
Canada 0.609 0.015 3.26% 3 0.621 0.043 -5.75% 3
Denmark 0.506 0.016 -3.08% 5 0.496 0.014 -2.07% 7
Finland 0.469 0.032 -13.56% 7 0.516 0.070 -21.19% 6
France 0.308 0.020 2.11% 17 0.345 0.019 3.19% 16
Germany 0.633 0.063 18.52% 2 0.670 0.079 -5.48% 2
Hungary 0.293 0.019 -0.91% 18 0.341 0.080 -4.00% 17
Iceland 0.283 0.040 10.61% 19 0.307 0.030 3.89% 18
Ireland 0.247 0.065 -12.22% 20 0.272 0.057 -10.54% 19
Italy 0.352 0.052 14.06% 15 0.401 0.033 3.00% 13
Luxembourg 0.197 0.011 -2.81% 22 0.214 0.008 0.46% 22
Mexico 0.373 0.067 19.34% 14 0.443 0.118 33.22% 11
Netherlands 0.380 0.020 2.99% 13 0.413 0.036 -8.63% 12
Norway 0.321 0.046 -13.23% 16 0.241 0.030 0.36% 21
Poland 0.436 0.111 -34.38% 10 0.348 0.116 26.87% 15
Portugal 0.157 0.020 6.16% 23 0.189 0.022 1.91% 23
Spain 0.490 0.084 19.17% 6 0.548 0.038 7.57% 4
Sweden 0.441 0.047 12.79% 9 0.459 0.033 -1.50% 9
Switzerland 0.736 0.096 23.32% 1 0.851 0.417 177.45% 1
United Kingdom 0.228 0.010 -2.29% 21 0.245 0.017 -3.83% 20
United States 0.567 0.025 0.63% 4 0.516 0.237 -9.50% 5
Mean 0.403 0.040 2.73% 0.424 0.068 8.06%
Expenditure Revenue
Source: authors‘ own calculations
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decentralization (a spectacular 177%) in revenue is shown by Switzerland, while 
Finland shows the highest rate of decline (-21%).  
These measures of fiscal decentralization, are considered by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 
(2006) as the most appropriate of all those available, in the absence of reliable 
alternatives. They have, nevertheless, been criticised for not measuring the degree of 
autonomy in regional government expenditure, and failing to make a distinction 
between tax- and non-tax revenue (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003; Rodden, 2004; Stegarescu, 
2005). To overcome the limitations of the fiscal decentralization indicators, we use an 
indicator based on Hooghe et al. (2008) to measure the degree of political 
decentralization in the sample countries
4
. 
1.4 Estimation and results 
The second stage of this study is to analyse the way in which decentralization in the 
sample countries affects their technical efficiency. We therefore need to determine 
whether the highest efficiency scores coincide with the highest degrees of 
decentralization or otherwise. To do this, we use technical efficiency as the dependent 
variable in an econometric model written as follows:  
      (1.1)it it it it itTE FD PD X u           
where itTE denotes technical efficiency in country i  in period t  , FD stands for fiscal 
decentralization, PD for political decentralization, X for the control variables and u  is 
the random error. 
The chosen control variables are GDP per capita, dependent population, consumer 
price index (CPI), population density, trade openness and ethnic segregation, all of 
which, except the last, are commonly used in literature concerning the relationship 
between efficiency in public service delivery and decentralization (Christopoulos, 2007; 
Letelier, 2011; Adam, Delis and Kammas, 2014). All the time-varying control variables 
are lagged one period in order to avoid any problem of reverse causality with the 
dependent variable. Using lagged values of the level variables is implemented by some 
scholars to adequately address the problem (Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee, 2002; 
Filippetti and Sacchi, 2013). 
                                                     
4
 Further details of the resulting indicator are provided in the appendix. 
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Real GDP per capita is used to control for economic development. Countries with 
high GDP are expected to have more productive, and therefore more efficient, public 
and private sectors (Adam, Delis and Kammas, 2014). 
The dependent population ratio (share of total  population under 16 and over 65) is a 
demographic variable which is expected to have a negative impact on efficiency by 
increasing taxes to strengthen social benefit programs (Adam, Delis and Kammas, 
2014). 
The CPI is used as an inflation indicator to help explain technical efficiency gaps 
between countries (Christopoulos, 2007). The rate of inflation may have a negative 
impact on total factor productivity (Miller and Upadhyay, 1997), thereby reducing 
economic growth and technical efficiency.  
In relation to population density, there are studies that try to see whether regions with 
higher levels of efficiency are those with very high population density (Raab and 
Lichty, 2002), a factor that is expected to generate economies of scale and thus increase 
efficiency (Adam et al., 2014). Population density is associated with the concept of 
―economies of agglomeration‖, roughly definable as all the advantages to be drawn 
from spatial concentration. Market dynamics lead to agglomeration, which leads to 
profitability and competition, and these, in turn, lead to an improvement in a country‘s 
efficiency. The perceived advantage of spatial concentration in the efficiency of the 
various economic, social, political, and other activities of a region or country can be 
explained in economic terms as indivisibilities or economies of scale (Manrique, 2006). 
Agglomeration also has its negative side, however, since it tends to generate congestion 
and social conflict, all of which negatively impact on efficiency. 
Trade openness is another factor that has been used to explain cross-country 
technical efficiency gaps. It is thought to boost competition between countries, 
encourage the adoption of technological advances and thus increase productive 
efficiency (Christopoulos, 2007). This theory is in line with the findings of Harrison 
(1996) and Frankel and Romer (1999), among others, who argue that more open 
economies, achieve higher rates of economic and productivity growth.  
The last of our control variables is ethnic segregation (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 
2011). Countries with high ethnic segregation are expected to exhibit lower efficiency 
since this implies political unrest and poorer governance (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 
2011). Geographical segregation could encourage secessionary movements, thus putting 
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additional stress on the central government, which may have to channel more resources 
into appeasement or repression and fewer into providing productive public goods and 
maintaining the quality of local governance. Therefore, the possibility of central 
governments‘ responding to secessionary threats by promoting decentralization suggests 
higher decentralization in ethnically-segregated countries. Use of the ethnic segregation 
variable is a novelty in the literature on the relationship between decentralization and 
public sector efficiency (Rayp and Van De Sijpe, 2007; Adam et al., 2014) or economic 
growth (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), where the ethno-fractionalization variable 
is widely used. Segregation offers the advantage of capturing the geographical location 
of the various ethnic groups. 
In the following table (Table 1.3) we can see the descriptive statistics of employed 
variables. 
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics, 1992-2009 
 
Having defined the control variables, we proceed to describe the model to be 
estimated. Since technical efficiency scores range between 0 and 1, we use a Tobit 
model that is commonly found in the literature on the second stage of DEA, where DEA 
efficiency scores are related to potential explanatory factors (Panizza, 1999; Afonso and 
St. Aubyn, 2006; Adam et al., 2014). 
The analysis uses random rather than fixed effects. The random effects estimator 
takes into account country data from different observed periods, and breaks down the 
error term into two parts: a fixed term and country-specific random error. This controls 
for individual heterogeneity, since each random error can be interpreted as a set of 
Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Ef. Constant returns 414 0.795 0.122 0.549 1.000
Ef. Variable returns 414 0.884 0.118 0.566 1.000
FD expenditure 414 0.403 0.150 0.123 0.950
FD revenue 414 0.423 0.189 0.004 2.476
Political decentralization 396 9.178 4.952 0.000 18.000
Log. GDP pc 414 9.886 0.635 7.984 10.938
Dependent population 414 66.592 1.838 58.301 71.450
CPI 414 89.490 16.559 1.153 141.445
Population density 414 122.359 115.171 2.277 490.079
Trade openness 406 0.7864 0.5069 0.1658 3.3408
Ethnic segregation 378 0.046 0.068 0.0006 0.244
Source: authors´own calculations
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country-specific factors not included in the regression (Greene, 1999). The reason for 
using random instead of fixed effects is that DEA technical efficiency estimates (Table 
1.1) show more cross-country than inter-temporal variation. Individual country 
efficiency scores vary little over time. Indeed, countries such as Iceland, Luxembourg, 
Poland, Switzerland, the UK and the US, maintain the same score from 1992 through to 
2009.  
Table 1.4 shows the results from the Tobit model using panel data and random 
effects with variable returns to scale and Table 1.5 shows the same but with constant 
returns to scale. Due to missing data on political decentralization we estimate four 
separate models.  
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Table 1.4: The impact of decentralization on technical efficiency (Tobit model) 
 
 
 
 
Fisc. Dec. Expenditure -.2221*** -.1796*** -.2207*** -.1892***
(.0457) (.0850) (.0835) (.0924)
Fisc. Dec. Revenues -.1344 -.0876 -.0941 -.0552
(.0689) (.0750) (.0644) (.0617)
Political decen. -.0050*** -.0055*** -.0044*** -.0051***
(.0021) (.0021) (.0022) (.0022)
log. GDP p.c. .0457 .0067 .0362 .0066 .0881 .0516 .1034 .0622
(.0482) (.0402) (.0482) (.0459) (.0480) (.0526) (.0632) (.0624)
Dependent pop. -.0412*** -.0440*** -.0475*** -.0493*** -.0392*** -.0410*** -.0445*** -.0466***
(.0055) (.0056) (.0064) (.0064) (.0055) (.0059) (.0067) (.0068)
CPI -.0005 -.0004 -.0006 -.0005 -.0005 -.0005 -.0006 -.0006
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0004)
Pop. Density -.0002 -.0003 -.0001 -.0001 -.0002 -.0003 -.0001 -.0001
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Openness -.0164 -.0160 -.0039 -.0047 -.0480 -.0461 -.0442 -.0396
(.0423) (.0310) (.0334) (.0336) (.0367) (.0387) (.0410) (.0409)
Segregation -.0133 -.1533 -.2668 -.3399
(.5589) (.6180) (.5944) (.6249)
Constant 2.082*** 2.5377*** 2.3882*** 2.7159*** 1.5732*** 1.9661*** 1.6202*** 2.0525***
(.5381) (.4710) (.5594) (.5443) (.5402) (.6194) (.7201) (.7324)
Observations 383 383 366 366 349 349 332 332
Wald chi2 69.13*** 67.07*** 78.02*** 75.10*** 70.13*** 65.21*** 76.10*** 72.92***
Notes: standard deviation in parentheses
Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.01, ***p < 0.01
Variable returns to scale
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Table 1.5: The impact of decentralization on technical efficiency (Tobit model) 
 
Fisc. Dec. Expenditure -.0548 -.0202 -0.0691 -.0441
(.0442) (.0458) (.0446) (.0455)
Fisc. Dec. Revenues .0194 .0243 .0200 .0249
(.0162) (.0155) (.0157) (.0154)
Political decen. -.0049*** -.0051*** -.0045*** -.0048***
(.0012) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012)
log. GDP p.c. .1289*** .1341*** .1181*** .1203*** .1476*** .1489*** .1551*** .1514***
(.0330) (.0347) (.0324) (.0326) (.0271) (.0279) (.0277) (.0274)
Dependent pop. -.0151*** -.0144*** -.0185*** -.0183*** -.0140*** -.0134*** -.0170*** -.0171***
(.0031) (.0033) (.0035) (.0035) (.0030) (.0031) (.0033) (.0033)
CPI -.0006*** -.0006*** -.0006*** -.0006*** -.0006*** -.0006*** -.0007*** -.0006***
(.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Pop. Density -.0007*** -.0008*** -.0004 -.0005*** -.0005*** -.0006*** -.0003 -.0003
(.0003) (.0003) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0001) (.0001)
Openness .0654*** .0593*** .0749*** .0707*** .0509*** .0448*** .0545*** .0502***
(.0218) (.0264) (.0219) (.0220) (.0214) (.0216) (.0208) (.0209)
Segregation .2054 .1721 -.1336 -.1605
(.3749) (.3948) (.3315) (.3450)
Constant .1645 .0838 .3742 .3377 -.1143 -.1640 -.0712 -.0529
(.3509) (.3833) (.3612) (.3649) (.2985) (.3077) (.3136) (.3133)
Observations 383 383 366 366 349 349 332 332
Wald chi2 124.87***  112.46*** 160.06*** 162.70*** 129.62***  126.86*** 171.72***  173.27***
Notes: standard deviation in parentheses
Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.01, ***p < 0.01
Constant returns to scale
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We focus, when commenting the results, on the latest model of all estimated 
(columns 7 and 8) as it is the one that includes all control and explanatory available 
variables. 
We can highlight that fiscal decentralization of expenditure with variable returns to 
scale (Table 1.4) is statistically significant and has a negative impact on the technical 
efficiency of the sample countries, whereas fiscal decentralization of revenue lacks 
significance
5
. Political decentralization also has a negative sign and is statistically 
significant from both the expenditure and the revenue perspective. So we can say that 
institutional detail matters (Voigt and Blume, 2012). 
With constant returns to scale (Table 1.5), only the variable of political 
decentralization and not the variables of fiscal decentralization (expenditure and 
revenue), appears significant with a negative sign. 
Potential correlation between the fiscal decentralization measures and random 
disturbances advises caution in the interpretation of the results of the Tobit model 
discussed so far. There are at least two possible sources of correlation: 1) the omission 
of explanatory variables that are correlated with decentralization and determine the 
technical efficiency of the country; and 2) reverse causality; that is, the possibility that 
technical efficiency is what determines the degree of fiscal decentralization. When 
working with panel data models affected by endogeneity, we can use fixed or random 
effect 2SLS methods to obtain consistent estimates. In this context one can use: the 
Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987) generalized 2SLS (G2SLS) or Baltagi 
(1981) error-component 2SLS (EC2SLS). The latter is the weighted average of the 
within and between 2SLS estimators, which is shown in Baltagi and Liu (2009) to have 
more instruments than G2SLS and to be more efficient in small samples. These 
advantages prompted us to use the EC2SLS estimator
6
. 
Following the literature we employ the population as the instrumental variable for 
fiscal decentralization (Arikan, 2004; Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010). We have 
checked that this variable is positive correlated with fiscal decentralization, and in 
                                                     
5
 We have tested an estimation including the squared fiscal decentralization index to study the possibility 
of a non-linear relationship between decentralization and efficiency. However we find no significance for 
the squared fiscal decentralization index so it suggests that there is no evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between the two variables. 
6
 See Baltagi and Liu (2009) for further details. 
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relation to the exogeneity condition, it seems reasonable to assume that population is 
uncorrelated with the random disturbance in our model. 
The results obtained with the instrumental variables (Table 1.6) show that fiscal 
decentralization of expenditure remains significant (column 7) and retains the same sign 
as in the previous estimation. In other words, countries with higher decentralization of 
expenditure are found to have lower technical efficiency. With respect to fiscal 
decentralization of revenue, we are able to state that, while it shows no significance with 
variable returns of scale (Table 1.6), it appears significant and negative (Table 1.7, 
column 8) with constant returns of scale.  In the case of political decentralization, it is 
not significant. 
Thus, we are able to conclude that fiscal decentralization of expenditure has a 
negative impact on technical efficiency with statistical significance, while the results for 
the impact of political decentralization vary according to the model considered. These 
results contrast with the results obtained by Blöchliger and Égert (2013) that suggest 
that fiscal competition between jurisdictions has become fiercer over the past 10 or 15 
years, enhancing public sector efficiency.  
Of the control variables included in vector X (Table 1.6), those that are significant 
have the expected sign, except for trade openness. Positive GDP coefficients, that is, 
higher GDP per capita, are associated with higher levels of technical efficiency 
(columns 7 and 8). The sign of the dependent population variable is negative, however. 
A higher ratio of dependents to total population has a negative impact on efficiency in 
all cases. The CPI also appears as statistically significant (columns 7 and 8) with the 
expected sign (negative). Trade openness is significant with a sign opposite to 
expectations in columns 7 and 8. The remaining control variables (population density 
and ethnic segregation) have no statistical significance in the estimations. These results 
are consistent with those reported in other studies (Christopoulos, D., 2007; Adam et al., 
2014). 
To test the robustness of these findings, we re-estimate the model using constant 
returns to scale (Table 1.7). In columns 7 and 8, containing all the variables, it can be 
seen that fiscal decentralization retains both its significance and its sign in the 
estimation using constant returns to scale. The same occurs with political 
decentralization, which is not significant. All the remaining variables except trade 
openness have the expected signs.  
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Finally, in view of the limitations of the fiscal decentralization indicators used in this 
study, the same estimations are repeated using alternative indicators developed by 
Stegarescu (2005). Please see the appendix for further details (Table A1.3). 
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Table 1.6: The impact of decentralization on technical efficiency (EC2SLS model) 
 
Fisc. Dec. Expenditure -0.2576 -.4220*** -.4267*** -.3825***
(.1646) (.1677) (.1308) (.1038)
Fisc. Dec. Revenues .0860 .0228 -.0500 -.0797
(.1006) (.1119) (.0725) (.0690)
Political decen. -.0010 -.0040*** .0011 -.0013
(.0018) (.0014) (.0017) (.0015)
log. GDP p.c. .0307 .0323 .0808*** .0438 .1281*** .1006*** .2113*** .1765***
(.0261) (.0256) (.0297) (.0272) (.0271) (.0221) (.0255) (.0214)
Dependent pop. -.0173*** -.0167*** -.0138*** -.0192*** -.0206*** -.0178*** -.0200*** -.0184***
(.0034) (.0039) (.0041) (.0038) (.0039) (.0039) (.0042) (.0042)
CPI -.0003 -.0005*** -.0006*** -.0007*** -.0003 -.0004 -.0011*** -.0011***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0003)
Pop. Density -.0001 -.0001 -.0000 -.0001 -.00005 .00004 -.00003 .00006
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.00009)
Openness -.0103 -.0127 -.0149 -.0084 -.0461 -.0609*** -.0503*** -.0582***
(.0198) (.0200) (.0206) (.0199) (.0249) (.0234) (.0230) (.0224)
Segregation .2495 .0183 -.0343 -.1606
(.2382) (.1991) (.1815) (.1674)
Constant 1.3095*** 1.1664*** .7947*** 1.1993*** .5281 .5858*** -.2857 -.0848
(.2927) (.3222) (.3353) (.3151) (.2933) (.2708) (.2664) (.2403)
Observations 383 383 366 366 349 349 332 332
Wald chi2 44.13*** 40.63*** 51.06***  52.13*** 61.69*** 56.06*** 97.10*** 92.63***
Notes: standard deviation in parentheses
Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.01, ***p < 0.01
Variable returns to scale
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Table 1.7: The impact of decentralization on technical efficiency (EC2SLS model) 
 
Fisc. Dec. Expenditure -.6896*** -.9555 -.6308*** -.5847**
(.2841) (.8480) (.1477) (.1806)
Fisc. Dec. Revenues -.3875 -.4913 -.2964*** -.2672**
(.2139) (.2937) (.0896) (.0856)
Political decen. .0002 -.0032 -.0018 -.0032
(.0047) (.0023) (.0016) (.0016)
log. GDP p.c. .1158*** .0497 .2409*** .0839 .1700*** .0873*** .2094*** .1526***
(.0395) (.0666) (.0936) (.0714) (.0308) (.0363) (.0387) (.0291)
Dependent pop. -.0021 -.0177*** .0084 -.0180*** -.0136*** -.0177*** -.0134*** -.0160***
(.0040) (.0084) (.0124) (.0091) (.0036) (.0047) (.0040) (.0045)
CPI .0001 -.0001 -.0004 -.0004 -.0003 -.0004 -.0008** -.0008***
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0003)
Pop. Density -.0002 -.0003 -.0005 -.0002 -.0003 -.0003 -.0002 -.0001
(.0004) (.0007) (.0011) (.0007) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0001)
Openness .0294 .0595 .0155 .0654 .0804*** .0805*** .0853*** .0630***
(.0257) (.0377) (.0340) (.0448) (.0257) (.0312) (.0262) (.0270)
Segregation .4911 .2438 .1386 -.0183
(.3567) (.3855) (.4288) (.2657)
Constant -.0062 1.0633 -1.3967 .8098 -.2060 .6408 -.5733 -.0191
(.4381) (.8759) (1.1205) (.9212) (.3330) (.4358) (.4166) (.3348)
Observations 383 383 366 366 349 349 332 332
Wald chi2 53.23*** 36.64***  45.06*** 30.53*** 104.48*** 67.76*** 128.38*** 94.23***
Notes: standard deviation in parentheses
Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.01, ***p < 0.01
Constant returns to scale
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1.5 Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to examine the impact of fiscal decentralization on technical 
efficiency in a sample of 23 OECD countries over the period 1992-2009. In this way, it 
makes a new contribution to the literature, which has so far focused on the impact of 
decentralization on efficiency in specific areas of the public sector, such as health or 
education, but not on countries‘ overall technical efficiency. Fiscal decentralization is a 
subject with arguments both for and against, and some authors claim that it has a 
positive impact on efficiency (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972) while others take the 
opposite view (Prud´homme, 1995; Stein, 1997). There is still much work to be done 
precisely on how to improve the design and implementation of fiscal decentralization 
systems. Thus, this study set out to shed some empirical light on a hitherto unexplored 
aspect of the issue. 
The results show that fiscal decentralization of expenditure and revenue has a 
negative impact on technical efficiency; that is, countries that are more decentralized 
show lower levels of technical efficiency. Taking into account the model with all 
control variables, the fiscal decentralization of expenditure always appears significant 
and negative when we consider variable returns of scale (situation more appropriate to 
evaluate pure technical efficiency of a country, irrespective of scale considerations).  
In order to compensate to some extent for limitations found in the selected fiscal 
decentralization indicators, we introduced a political decentralization indicator 
developed from that of Hooghe et al. (2008), finding that, in the tobit model, the 
political decentralization also appears significant and affecting negatively to efficiency.  
Therefore, these results show that fiscal decentralization of expenditure adversely 
affects the technical efficiency of the sample countries and the same occurs with fiscal 
decentralization of revenue but considering constant return of scale in the EC2SLS 
model estimation.  
So in this world when decentralization is an ongoing process it is necessary to 
continue working on the effects of all kind of decentralization on different economic 
aspects as efficiency. In moving forward it will be important to find better instrumental 
variables in order to better deal with the issue of endogeneity. And it would also be 
important to improve the standardization and overall quality of decentralization data, 
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something international organizations like the OECD or the World Bank have talked 
about doing in the past. 
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Appendix  
Table A1.1: Description of the control variables 
 
 
 
Variables Source Period Units and definition
GDP per capita World Development Indicators, World Bank 1992-2009 Gross Domestic Product, $ of 2000 (in logs)
Num. of employed World Development Indicators, World Bank 1992-2009 Number of persons (in logs). Employed population
Physical capital stock Berlemann and Wesserhöft, October 2012 1992-2009 $ of 2000 (in logs). Physical capital stock includes lands improved, lands purchased, machinery and equipment, roads, 
railways etc. schools, offices, hospitals, private houses and commercial and industrial premises.
Human capital World Development Indicators, World Bank 1992-2009 Average number of years schooling of total population * number employed
Dependent population World Development Indicators, World Bank 1992-2009 Ratios of population under 16 and over 65 to total population
Consumer price index World Development Indicators, World Bank 1992-2009 Consumer Price Index (2005=100)
Population density World Development Indicators, World Bank 1992-2009 Inhabitants per square km.
Trade openness World Development Indicators, World Bank 1992-2009 (Exports+Imports)/GDP (constant 2005 US$)
Ehtnic segregation Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) 2000 Index of ethnic segregation calculated by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011)
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Table A1.2: Technical efficiency of OECD countries assuming constant returns to scale, 
1992-2009 
 
 
 
Constant returns to scale Mean Standard deviation Ranking
Australia 0.751 0.027 13
Austria 0.655 0.023 21
Belgium 0.735 0.019 15
Canada 0.836 0.026 7
Denmark 0.853 0.027 6
Finland 0.712 0.069 17
France 0.755 0.013 12
Germany 0.668 0.025 20
Hungary 0.614 0.052 23
Iceland 0.822 0.041 10
Ireland 0.930 0.089 5
Italy 0.723 0.024 16
Luxembourg 1.000 0.000 1
Mexico 0.827 0.027 8
Netherlands 0.750 0.023 14
Norway 0.823 0.051 9
Poland 0.997 0.013 3
Portugal 0.655 0.023 22
Spain 0.705 0.019 18
Sweden 0.801 0.060 11
Switzerland 0.699 0.082 19
United Kingdom 0.976 0.022 4
United States 0.997 0.007 2
Mean 0.795 0.033
Source: authors‘ own calculations
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Political decentralization index 
Political decentralization is meant to give the local/regional population or their elected 
representatives more power in public decision making. For this analysis, we use some of 
the best-known indices, which are those that appear in Hooghe et al. (2008). They cover 
a broad range of aspects of decentralization, including fiscal autonomy, representation, 
executive power, policy scope, etc., in 42 countries for the period 1950 to 2006. Based 
on the indicators of Hooghe et al. (2008), we develop our own indicator of political 
decentralization, which is the sum of three indices: 
1) Institutional depth: the extent to which a regional government is autonomous 
rather than deconcentrated (values between 0 and 3). 
2) Policy scope: the range of policies for which a regional government is 
responsible (values between 0 and 4). 
3) Representation: the extent to which a region is endowed with an independent 
legislature and executive (vales between 0 and 4). 
 
Stegarescu indicators 
The fiscal decentralization indicators used in this study, subnational share in total public 
expenditure and subnational share in total government tax revenue, have been criticised 
for the reasons described in a previous section. We therefore perform a new estimation 
using the fiscal decentralization indicators of Stegarescu (2005), specifically the TD1 
indicator, which the author claims to be the most appropriate because it considers only 
own taxes that are mainly independently chosen by sub-central governments as 
autonomous, is thus defined as  
TD1= SCG (sub-central government) own tax revenue from (a) to (c) /GG (general 
government) total tax revenue  
(a) SCG determines tax rate and tax base 
(b) SCG determines tax rate only 
(c) SCG determines tax base only 
Since the above indicator for the 23 OECD countries of interest are available from 
1965 to 2001, the estimation period in this case will be 1992-2001, that is, a different 
one from that used in the previous estimations (1992-2009). Furthermore, since these 
indicators are for the decentralization of tax revenue, the estimation is oriented in that 
direction. 
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The results, shown in Table A1.3, are not comparable with the previous ones, due to 
the peculiarities of the fiscal decentralization indicator used in the estimation and to the 
difference in the estimation period. 
It can be seen in column 1 that fiscal decentralization is significant and has a 
negative sign, thus confirming the previous results, which established that fiscal 
decentralization of revenues has a negative impact on technical efficiency. Political 
decentralization in the Tobit model is also significant and with a negative sign (columns 
2 and 4). 
In the model including instrumental variables, political decentralization is still 
significant and negative (columns 6 and 8); unlike fiscal decentralization, which 
presents different signs. In fact, taking into account all the variables except segregation, 
the sign for fiscal decentralization has changed from negative in the all the other 
estimations to positive. This is the only model showing it to have a positive impact on 
technical efficiency.  
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Table A1.3: The impact of decentralization on technical efficiency (Stegarescu indicators) 
TD1 Stegarescu -.0025*** -.0010 -.0021 -.0007 .0034 .0044*** -.0000 -.0002
(.0012) (.0012) (0012) (.0012) (.0030) (.0019) (.0022) (.0012)
Political decen. -.0056*** -.0055*** -.0055*** -.0031***
(.0018) (.0018) (.0015) (.0013)
log. GDP p.c. .0325 .0305 .0876 .0680 -.0173 .0554 .0026 .1309***
(.0597) (.0692) (.0902) (.0851) (.0597) (.0503) (.0606) (.0446)
Dependent pop. .0114 .0068 0.0138 .0090 .0047 .0070 .0082 .0127
(.0118) (.0116) -0.012 (.0118) (.0088) (.0078) (.0086) (.0073)
CPI -.0006 -.0006 -.0005 -.0006 -.0003 -.0005 -.0003 -.0005
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0002) (.0003) (.0002) (.0002)
Pop. Density .00003 .0001 .0001 .0002 .0002 .0004*** .00009 .0002***
(.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0001) (.0002) (.0001)
Openness -.0230 -.0167 -.1034 -.0711 .0114 -.0122 -.0202 -.0912***
(.0634) (.0593) (.0835) (.0832) (.0514) (.0380) (.0645) (.0436)
Segregation -.5054 -.5157 -.4190 -.1655
(.5245) (.5260) (.4997) (.2256)
Constant .3649 .5475 -.2211 .1379 .8390 .0672 .6404 -.7244
(.6266) (.7536) (1.022) (.9747) (.7116) (.5417) (.7116) (.4813)
Observations 163 163 154 154 163 163 154 154
Wald chi2 8.04*** 18.45*** 12.38*** 19.73***  4.27*** 23.11***  4.68*** 142***
Notes: standard deviation in parentheses
Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.01, ***p < 0.01
Variable returns of scale Variable returns of scale
 TOBIT model  EC2SLS  model
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Chapter 2 
Can fiscal decentralization mitigate the shadow 
economy? An empirical analysis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The shadow economy (SE) is a worldwide and growing phenomenon that most societies 
try to bring under control. Governments approach the problem with different means, 
such as prosecution and penalties. Shadow activities lead to a deterioration in labour 
conditions, harm the business environment through unfair competition, and threaten the 
financial sustainability of social protection systems (European Commisions, 2007; 
OECD, 2012; Williams and Renooy, 2013). There is an obvious need, therefore, to fight 
against undeclared activities and turn them into regularized work. 
Most researchers attempting to measure the SE meet with the problem of how to 
define it. A common definition includes all unregistered economic activities 
contributing to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) officially calculated (or observed) 
(Frey and Pommerehne, 1984; Feige, 1989, 1994; Schneider, 1994a, 2003, 2005, 2007; 
Feld and Schneider, 2010). Another comes directly from the 1993 United Nations 
System of National Accounts (SNA), according to which the underground economy 
includes legal production activities that are: 
“deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following kinds of reasons: to 
avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; to avoid payment of social 
security contributions; to avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as 
minimum wages, maximum hours, safety or health standards, etc; to avoid complying 
with certain administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or 
other administrative forms.” (Eurostat, et. al, 1993 p. 153 and OECD, 2002, p. 139). 
The SE poses a serious problem for the public sector, because it leads to a loss of 
revenue in terms of unpaid income tax, public social security contributions and VAT; it 
hampers attempts to generate social cohesion by reducing the government‘s available 
resources for investing in social integration and tax mobility (Williams and Windebank, 
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1998); it weakens unions and undermines collective bargaining power (Gallin, 2001); 
and, if a significant segment of the population engages consistently in such activity, it 
may encourage a more carefree attitude towards law in a broader sense (Renooy et al., 
2004). 
There are two points of view on the causes of undeclared work: the liberal open-
market perspective and the structuralist perspective. The first of these sees the SE as a 
direct consequence of excessive tax burden, government corruption and stifling control 
and regulation. In order to halt its growth, therefore, countries would have to opt for the 
reduction of fiscal pressure, deregulation and minimal state intervention (De Soto, 1989, 
2001; Becker, 2004; London and Hart, 2004). According to the second point of view, 
undeclared work is a direct consequence of inefficient regulation, coupled with the 
absence of intervention in the labor market and social protection (Gallin, 2001; Davis, 
2006; Meagher, 2010; Slavnic, 2010). 
The SE has reached massive proportions, accounting for 17.2% of GDP in 162 
countries between 1999 and 2006/2007 (Schneider et al., 2010), which can raise crucial 
issues, such as inadequate fiscal capacity for growth in the case of developing countries 
(Besley and Persson, 2010). In addition, developed countries, especially in southern 
Europe, having faced severe crises and critical budgetary positions, report high 
percentages of SE, above 20% of GDP. 
There are different ways for governments to deal with the crisis, such as reducing 
public spending or raising taxes to increase government revenue. But such measures 
meet with strong resistance from large sectors of society. Policy makers often propose 
strict enforcement strategies to combat the SE, different strategies must therefore be 
considered to control the SE which is undermining countries‘ attempts to emerge from 
the crisis. 
What impact, if any, does fiscal decentralization have on the shadow economy? 
Decentralization can exert influence on the SE in two ways: by improving public sector 
efficiency (the efficiency effect) or by reducing the distance between official and 
economic agents, which increases the probability of detection of SE activities (the 
deterrence effect). In this paper we are going to study the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on the SE using a sample of 23 OECD countries for the period 1999 to 
2009.  
This paper examines various aspects that have so far been left largely unaddressed. 
Its first contribution is to undertake the analysis with panel data, in contrast to the cross-
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sectional approach used in previous studies. The main advantages of using panel data 
are that it provides valid information on countries by studying them over time obtains a 
more complete picture of the problem and enables easier interpretation of the dynamics 
of change; and, by linking the time-specific and country-specific dimensions of the 
problem, increases the model‘s degrees of freedom. 
The paper‘s second contribution is to analyze the effect of the fiscal decentralization 
of expenditure and revenue on the SE, both in aggregate terms and functionally 
disaggregated into education expenditures, health expenditures and social protection 
expenditures, all of which directly affect the citizen‘s utility function. The consideration 
of these decentralized and disaggregated indicators of expenditure is one of the 
innovations of this study with respect to previous ones. The literature tends to find a 
positive link between the level of decentralization and individuals‘ life satisfaction 
(Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Voigt and Blume, 2009; Díaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose, 
2012). These results are consistent with the ‗fiscal decentralization theorem‘ (Tiebout, 
1956; Klugman, 1994): a better matching of public goods and services delivery to the 
needs of citizens leads, ceteris paribus, to greater satisfaction with policy and political 
institutions. Institutions, in turn, lead to improvements in individual well-being (Frey 
and Stutzer, 2012). Citizens find government spending in education, health and social 
protection useful, since it affects them directly and brings them well-being. If expenses 
are decentralized, regional and local authorities, whose proximity gives them a better 
understanding of their citizens‘ needs and preferences are able to provide more adequate 
quantities of public goods and services. As a result, residents will be more satisfied with 
their authority‘s performance, less tempted to work in the SE, and more inclined to pay 
the taxes needed to provide these services. Likewise, shadow employment leads to 
lower tax revenues, thus fewer resources for governments to spend on education, health 
and social protection, and ultimately a negative impact on citizens‘ utility. Díaz-Serrano 
and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) analyze whether decentralization has an impact on citizens‘ 
satisfaction with public services, such as education and healthcare, and whether it is a 
potential driver of trust in institutions and public policies. They find health and 
education to be crucial elements in the generation of public trust. Their analysis reveals 
that the perceived state of education and health services is affected by the degree of 
decentralization. More specifically, they indicate that fiscal decentralization, measured 
as the expenditure capacity of sub national governments, exerts a positive influence on 
satisfaction with political institutions. 
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Thus, one of the objectives of this study is to analyze whether the greater spending 
capacity of regional governments in areas such as education, health and social 
protection, directly affects citizens‘ satisfaction, and dissuades them from joining the 
shadow economy which hampers their governments‘ attempts to meet their needs. 
The work is structured as follows: after this introduction, section two presents a 
review of the literature dealing with the relationship between decentralization and the 
SE. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 explains the empirical 
model and discusses the results. The fifth and final section presents the main 
conclusions. 
 
2.2 Review of the literature 
The literature on the SE shows that the tax burden and social security contributions, 
labor market regulations, the quality of public goods and services, and the state of the 
"official" economy are the principal reasons why a SE exists (Johnson et al., 1998; 
Friedman et al., 2000; Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
In relation to the tax burden and social security contributions, and given that taxes 
affect the work-leisure choice and encourage people to join the SE, it is the distortion of 
the overall tax burden that is the key concern of economists. The greater the difference 
between pre-tax earnings and post-tax earnings in the formal economy, the greater will 
be people‘s incentive to avoid any deduction from their gross income by working in the 
SE. Most of the deduction goes to social security and income tax payments, and these, 
therefore, are main reasons behind the existence and growth of the SE. 
Some studies find the tax burden to have an increasing effect on the SE (Schneider, 
1994b, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2007; Johnson et al., 1998) and all find statistically significant 
evidence of the influence of taxes on SE (Kirchgaessner, 1983, 1984; Klovland, 1984; 
Schneider, 1986). 
Although, as far as we know, little work has been done on the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on SE, we are able to cite some papers that focus on these issues 
(Alexeev and Habodaszova, 2007; Torgler et al., 2010, among others).  
The main argument in favor of decentralization is based on Oates‘ (1972) 
decentralization theorem, which claims that local governments are in a better position to 
achieve a more efficient supply of public goods and services given their understanding 
of citizens‘ preferences. In other words, the transfer of power to regional governments 
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increases the efficiency of the public sector, and contributes to greater development and 
economic growth (Oates, 1993; Baskaran and Feld, 2009). Local authorities are better 
informed about local needs and can thus provide the socially-optimal amount of public 
goods. Not all the arguments are in favour, however. Fiscal decentralization can have a 
negative impact on economies, as argued by authors such as Prud‘homme, (1995) and 
Stein (1997). This negative impact may be due to the number of potential advantages 
that central governments are able to obtain from the provision of public goods.  In the 
presence of economies of scale, further decentralization makes the production and 
distribution of public goods more costly (Stein, 1997). In addition, local and regional 
governments are often too small to deliver public goods and services efficiently 
(Prud‘homme, 1995). There are probably more advantages to centralized distribution in 
the case of capital-intensive goods, where mass investment is needed to reduce unit 
distribution costs (Frenkel, 1986). 
A government that is in tune with the public goods needs of local companies is more 
likely to prevent firms from transferring their activity to the SE. Moreover, the increase 
of efficiency resulting from decentralization increases tax morale (the issue of whether 
citizens find fiscal evasion justifiable) and consequently limits SE activities (Torgler et 
al., 2010). Likewise, closer proximity between government employees and citizens 
facilitates the supervision of clandestine activities (Dell‘Anno and Teobaldelli, 2012; 
Buehn et al., 2013). Decentralization also improves government efficiency and therefore 
reduces the SE (the efficiency effect). Thus, we can expect that the greater the degree of 
decentralization, the smaller the SE. 
The deterrence effect is based on three factors which determine the decision to 
migrate into the SE: 1) expected net cost savings from tax avoidance and non-payment 
of social security contributions; 2) market regulations and 3) fines and the probability of 
detection (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Feld and Larsen, 2011). The importance of the 
last factor may be influenced by the degree of decentralization, since it reduces the 
distance between bureaucrats and economic agents. The greater the frequency of their 
face-to-face contact, the greater the probability of detection and, therefore, the lower the 
expected net gains from SE activities. Decentralization enhances the deterrent effect and 
is expected to reduce the size of the SE, but the opposite effect is possible. Another 
problem with regional governments is the increased danger of their falling prey to 
corrupt practices or pressure from lobbies (Prud‘homme, 1995). Local governments can 
easily become the victims of manoeuvring by elites or lobbies (Inman and Rubinfeld, 
 
 
55 
 
2000; Storper, 2005) and thus more vulnerable to corruption, nepotism and clientelism. 
Tanzi (1995) also believes that corruption is more common at local than at national 
level, particularly in developing countries.  
Until now, studies of the influence of decentralization on the SE have focused on the 
analysis of cross-sectional data as opposed to the panel data approach adopted in this 
paper. In fact, Buehn et al. (2013, p. 2570) mentioned that ―…using a panel data instead 
of a cross-section data set would be preferable as this would allow us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity between countries…‖  
Although there is substantial literature on various aspects of the SE, few studies 
address the impact of decentralization. Alexeev and Habodaszova (2007) analyze the 
effect of decentralization on local government incentives to provide local public goods.  
They use a cross-section model for a sample of 82 countries. The results show that 
decentralization reduces the size of the SE by curbing corruption and improving 
productivity through greater provision of public goods. 
Torgler et al. (2010) study the relationship between decentralization, tax morale and 
the SE. The effect of decentralization on tax morale is analyzed using individual data 
from the Swiss International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). In order to complement 
the micro approach, they also look at the relationship between decentralization and the 
SE using cantonal level Swiss data. They find that a higher degree of fiscal 
decentralization increases tax morale and reduces the size of the SE. 
Teobaldelli (2011) analyzes the relationship between federalism and the SE. Her 
theoretical analysis finds that the SE is smaller in federal than in unitary countries. The 
results are tested using a cross-section of up to 73 countries. The size of the SE was 
found to be smaller by all the decentralization measures considered. 
Buehn et al. (2013) study the impact of decentralization on the SE. The results 
obtained for a sample of 73 countries reveal that fiscal decentralization has no 
significant impact on the SE, and is therefore not an appropriate policy instrument for 
reducing it. Although all the measures of political decentralization show negative 
coefficients, the only significant coefficient is that of the number of vertical tiers of 
government. As a result, their cautious interpretation is that political decentralization is 
useful in controlling the SE. The share of sub-national government employment in total 
civilian government employment (government employment decentralization) has a 
highly significant negative effect on the SE (a deterrent effect), and finally, employment 
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decentralization is more effective in controlling the SE in countries with weak 
institutional quality. 
Goel and Saunoris (2014) examine the effects on the SE of various forms of 
decentralization of government functions. They use four dimensions of decentralization: 
the tiers of government and subnational government employment (physical 
decentralization); and subnational government expenditures and subnational 
government revenue (fiscal decentralization). While baseline results show 
decentralization to reduce the SE, they find differences in its effectiveness only between 
physical and fiscal decentralization: greater physical decentralization is more effective 
at reducing widespread shadow economies, while fiscal decentralization is more 
effective with smaller shadow sectors.  
 
2.3 Data 
In this section we explain the data employed for the empirical analysis. 
It is very difficult to obtain concise information regarding the SE because the agents 
who participate in it do not wish to be identified. Therefore, the SE data used in this 
paper are the estimated sizes and trends obtained by Buehn and Schneider (2012a) for 
39 OECD developed countries for the period 1999 to 2010. We consider 23 countries in 
our sample because the data from IMF for decentralization is for these 23 countries. 
In general terms, the possible methods for determining the scope of the SE can be 
grouped into direct and indirect methods. Most of them quantify the SE as a percentage 
of GDP.  
Direct methods are mainly based on large-scale surveys. Surveys are used in many 
countries (Norway by Isachsen et al., 1982; Denmark by Mogensen et al., 1995, and 
Pedersen, 2003), but present some of the drawbacks common to all surveys: money and 
time costs, the difficulty of obtaining a representative sample, lack of cooperation from 
the agents involved, subjectivity in the design and administration of the questionnaire, 
and so on. These drawbacks generate doubts regarding the reliability and credibility of 
such data. 
It is more common when using indirect methods to calculate the SE with 
representative indicators and/or tracking undeclared labor statistics, which are to be 
found among data collected for other purposes (GHK and Fondazione Brodolini, 2009). 
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Buehn and Schneider (2012a) use a specific type of indirect measure known as the 
MIMIC approach (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes). The MIMIC procedure 
assumes that the SE remains an unobservable phenomenon (latent variable) that can be 
estimated using measurable causes of illicit employment, e.g. the tax burden and 
regulatory intensity, and indicators reflecting illicit activities, e.g. the currency demand 
or official working time.  
This approach is not free from criticism (Breusch, 2005; Feige, 2015). One 
disadvantage of the MIMIC procedure is that it produces only relative estimates of the 
size and development trend of the SE. Nevertheless, there is a consensus in the 
academic community with regards to the suitability of indirect methods to measure the 
SE and survey methods to explore its nature (European Commission, 2007b; OECD, 
2012). The reliability of the MIMIC procedure is confirmed by the fact that it is 
commonly used by entities such as the World Bank to measure the global SE (Schneider 
et al., 2010). Moreover, it yields relative magnitudes of the shadow SE for subsequent 
econometric estimation. 
From the indicators mentioned above and using the MIMIC approach, Buehn and 
Schneider (2012a) estimate the SE data shown in Table A2.1 in the appendix. Figure 2.1 
shows only means for 23 OECD countries and those with more extreme values. It can 
be seen that the sample country with the largest SE as a percentage of its GDP is 
Mexico with 30% on average throughout the period. It is followed by Italy and Poland 
with 27% and 26.7%, respectively. At the opposite extreme, we find Switzerland (8.3%) 
and United States (8.6%). 
In Table A2.1 we can see the size of SE for studied countries. A study by Schneider 
(2009) reports that the crisis that started in 2008 would increase the SE in 21 OECD 
countries by an average of 0.5 percent of GDP during 2009, after a run of annual 
declines since 2001. The crisis is likely to have shifted the incidence of noncompliance 
toward the sectors most affected by the downturn or trigger a higher incidence of some 
forms of noncompliance (Brondolo, 2009).  Therefore, during times of economic 
downturn, rising unemployment, lower disposable income, and fears about the future, a 
greater number of individuals tend to drift into ―shadow activities‖ – by taking on 
additional employment that goes unreported, or underreporting shop sales, for example 
– in order to improve personal finances and compensate for missing income streams. 
We are unable to confirm this with the data at our disposal, however. 
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Figure 2.1: Estimated shadow economy for selected OECD countries 
 
  Source: Authors‘ own calculation from Table A1.1 in the appendix 
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In the following paragraphs we detail the explanatory variables that will be used in 
the empirical analysis. 
The first is the fiscal decentralization of expenditure and revenue, which involves the 
delegation of responsibilities for expenditure and/or revenue to lower levels of 
government. For the study we use two widely-used measures of fiscal decentralization: 
the subnational share of total public expenditure and the subnational share of total 
government revenue (e.g. Oates, 1985, 1993; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and 
Phillips, 1998; Thieben, 2003; Iimi, 2005). According to Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 
(2006), these measures are the most appropriate of those available in the absence of 
more reliable alternatives. Nonetheless, these indicators have been criticized for failing 
to identify the degree of autonomy in regional government expenditure, and also failing 
to differentiate between tax and non-tax sources of revenue (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003; 
Rodden, 2004; Stegarescu, 2005). These indicators have been computed from 
Government Finance Statistics (IMF)
7
. 
 
                                                     
7
See tables A2.2 and A2.3 in the appendix for more details. 
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Table 2.1: Indicators of decentralization (1999-2009) 
Decentralization
Country Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking
Australia 0.385 15 0.386 15 0.599 9 0.480 14 0.101 19
Austria 0.422 10 0.445 11 0.438 16 0.572 11 0.204 16
Belgium 0.465 9 0.472 7 0.857 6 0.253 17 0.389 10
Canada 0.619 3 0.626 3 0.950 2 0.892 4 0.462 4
Denmark 0.510 6 0.495 6 0.511 13 0.966 2 0.612 2
Finland 0.473 7 0.462 8 0.552 12 0.689 8 0.542 3
France 0.314 16 0.353 16 0.279 17 0.204 18 0.240 12
Germay 0.666 2 0.685 2 0.966 1 0.782 6 0.420 8
Hungary 0.299 18 0.338 17 0.570 10 0.706 7 0.225 14
Iceland 0.305 17 0.326 18 0.564 11 0.016 21 0.448 5
Ireland 0.240 20 0.263 19 0.207 20 0.496 13 0.167 18
Italy 0.389 14 0.423 13 0.279 18 0.660 9 0.090 21
Luxembourg 0.191 22 0.215 22 0.246 19 0.050 19 .
Mexico 0.418 11 0.517 5 . . .
Netherlands 0.392 13 0.395 14 0.485 14 0.382 15 0.236 13
Norway 0.292 19 0.228 21 0.640 8 0.380 16 0.196 17
Poland 0.399 12 0.432 12 0.485 15 0.632 10 0.365 11
Portugal 0.171 23 0.201 23 0.086 21 0.046 20 0.097 20
Spain 0.546 5 0.572 4 0.928 4 0.927 3 0.433 6
Sweden 0.471 8 0.460 9 0.705 7 0.824 5 0.419 9
Switzerland 0.780 1 0.945 1 0.895 5 0.988 1 0.614 1
United Kingdom 0.230 21 0.244 20 . . 0.211 15
United States 0.578 4 0.450 10 0.928 3 0.533 12 0.427 7
Source: Author’s own calculations from Government Finance Statistics (IMF)
Expenditure on education Expenditure on health Expenditure on social protectionTotal expenditure Total revenue
 
 
61 
 
The data in Table 2.1 reveal significant cross-country differences in the degree of 
fiscal decentralization. In fact, on the expenditure side (columns 2 and 3), the difference 
between the most decentralized country, Switzerland, and the least decentralized, 
Portugal, is 60.9%. There is a similar picture on the revenue side (columns 4 and 5), 
where the difference is even greater, 74.4% between the most decentralized 
(Switzerland) and the least decentralized country (Portugal).  
In addition to these aggregate measures of fiscal decentralization in terms of 
expenditure and revenue, we use other disaggregated measures of fiscal decentralization 
in expenditures, more specifically, expenditure on education, health and social 
protection. These indicators are defined as the percentage spent by sub central 
governments on education, health and social protection, respectively, in relation to total 
national spending in those areas
8
.  
According to Table 2.1, the country with the most decentralized education 
expenditure regime is Germany, while that with the least is Portugal. With respect to 
health expenditure, the most decentralized country is Switzerland and the least is 
Iceland. Finally, for social protection expenditure, Italy shows the lowest degree of 
decentralization, while Switzerland once again shows the highest. 
The tax morale indicator measures the individual‘s willingness to pay taxes, in other 
words, recognition of the moral duty to pay taxes or the belief that paying taxes is a way 
of contributing to society. The data are drawn from the World Values Survey Wave 
(WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS), where citizens are asked if they consider 
fiscal evasion justifiable. The response scale ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 means that 
the respondent considers that tax cheating is never justifiable, and 10, means that the 
respondent considers that it is always justifiable. Although this indicator can be 
computed for later periods, we use the one for 1999 to avoid problems of simultaneity 
with the SE indicator.  
Using the available data, we compute a tax morale indicator using the average rating 
weighted by the number of respondents and answers obtained. The results are 
summarized in Table 2.2. 
                                                     
8
See tables A2.4, A2.5 and A2.6 in the appendix for more details. 
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Table 2.2: Tax morale of OECD countries 
 
The overall observation is that all countries show a tax morale index of between 2 
and 3 indicating that they do not consider tax cheating justifiable. Belgium appears to be 
the country with the loosest tax morale (over 3.5), while the United States is the one 
with the strictest (1.72). 
Other control variables included in the empirical analysis are the following
9
: 
GDP per capita is used as an indicator of the country‘s economic development. It is 
expected to show a negative sign, given that more prosperous and developed countries 
with better public institutions have better measures with which to combat the SE. These 
are also countries where the official economy performs better, thus discouraging firms 
from participating in SE sectors. 
Ethnic segregation (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011) is a variable that has not been 
used in other studies. Use of the ethnic segregation variable is a novelty in the literature 
on the relationship between decentralization and the shadow economy, where the usual 
variable has been ethnic fractionalization (Teobaldelli, 2011; Goel and Saunoris, 2014). 
Segregation offers the advantage of capturing the geographical location of the various 
ethnic groups and of being more closely correlated with fiscal decentralization than is 
the case for fractionalization. 
                                                     
9
Further details of the control variables are given in the Appendix (table A2.7). 
Australia 2.15 Luxembourg 3.35
Austria 2.10 Mexico 3.08
Belgium 3.61 Netherlands 2.74
Canada 2.08 Norway 2.71
Denmark 2.00 Poland 2.14
Finland 2.55 Portugal 2.44
France 3.04 Spain 2.35
Germany 2.37 Sweden 2.42
Hungary 2.09 Switzerland 2.60
Iceland 2.23 United Kingdom 2.43
Ireland 2.29 United States 1.72
Italy 2.39
Source: Authors‘own calculations from World Values Survey and European Values.
Study period 1995-1999
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Demographic characteristics, such as urban population may affect the SE (Schneider 
and Torgler, 2007). A higher level of urbanisation might increase anonymity, and thus 
reduce loyalty towards the state; which might lead to a higher level of SE. 
Self-employed persons do not, per se, have lower tax morale than other taxpayers, but 
they do have better opportunities for tax evasion (Torgler et al., 2010). Therefore, we 
expect a positive sign.  
The institutional quality variable is the mean value of the three governance 
indicators: ―government effectiveness‖, ―control of corruption‖, and ―rule of law‖ 
provided by Kaufmann et al. (2009). We expect to find that the higher the quality of the 
country‘s government institutions, the lower the level of SE (Buehn et al., 2013). 
Local autonomy (Treisman, 2002) is a dummy variable for whether local 
governments have a degree of autonomy in some specific aspect of government or the 
constitution grants exclusive power of decision on the matter to the national 
government. It is used to compensate for the limitations introduced by the fiscal 
decentralization indicators, such as failing to measure the degree of autonomy in 
regional government expenditure, and failing to make a distinction between tax- and 
non-tax revenue (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003; Rodden, 2004; Stegarescu, 2005). It is an 
indicator of political decentralization that Buehn et al. (2013) expected to have a 
negative sign, because it would indicate the validity of the efficiency and tax morale 
effects. However, we can also predict a positive sign, because local governments are 
more susceptible to corruption or to being captured by interest groups (Prud‘homme, 
1995), both of which act as drivers of the SE.  
The number of vertical tiers of government (Treisman, 2002) is also an indicator of 
political decentralization that is expected to show a negative sign. It varies between 1 
and 6 and can be used as a proxy for the distance between bureaucrats and economic 
agents.  
Tax revenues (Buehn et al., 2013) is the variable for the government‘s total tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP. The expected sign is ambiguous. On the one hand, if 
the correlation between tax revenues and SE is positive, it means that the higher the 
government‘s tax revenues, the higher the taxes that citizens have to pay and in 
consequence, the higher the incentive to join the SE. On the other hand, we can expect a 
negative sign because the higher the government‘s tax revenues, the higher its capacity 
to spend on providing its citizens with public goods and services and the lower the 
incentive to defraud.  
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Finally, we use a variable for the highest marginal corporation tax rate. The higher 
the rate of tax that firm have to pay, the higher their motivation to participate in the SE 
(Buehn et al., 2013). 
 
2.4 Empirical analysis and results 
 
The objective of this study is to determine whether a country‘s degree of fiscal 
decentralization has an effect on the size of its SE. Therefore, we estimate an 
econometric model using panel data, where the dependent variable is the SE and the 
explanatory variables are fiscal decentralization and all the control variables defined in 
the section above.   
it t it it itSE FD X u           (2.1) 
where itSE refers to the shadow economy in country i  in period t , and t is a vector of 
year dummies to control for events specific to each year, such as a crisis affecting all 
countries, FD is fiscal decentralization, X the control variables and u the random error 
term. 
The analysis uses random effects rather than fixed effects. Estimation with random 
effects considers the data for each country in each study period and decomposes the 
error into two parts: a common fixed part, plus a specific random part for each country. 
This controls for individual heterogeneity because each random error can be interpreted 
as a set of country-specific factors that are not included in the regression (Greene, 
1999).The reason for using random instead of fixed effects is that SEs (Table A2.1) 
show more cross-country than inter-temporal variation.  
The following table (Table 2.3) shows the estimation results. Among them, we can 
highlight the significant negative impact of fiscal decentralization in expenditure on the 
SE. That is, the higher a country‘s degree of fiscal decentralization in expenditure, the 
lower its level of SE. This empirically validates the fact that a higher degree of 
decentralization reduces the distance between government employees and economic 
agents. The hypothesis that we set up was that decentralization would reduce the size of 
the SE. 
However, the same is not found for the impact of fiscal decentralization in revenues, 
which does not appear to be significant. In relation to the other explanatory variables, 
we observe that those that appear to be significant show the expected sign. This is the 
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case of GDP per capita, which shows that the higher a country‘s GDP per capita, the 
lower its level of SE. This implies that more developed countries have more capacity to 
control this type of activity. Finally, tax burden has a negative sign. The marginal 
corporation tax rate is not significant, so there is no proof of a higher tax rate being 
associated with higher SE in the sample countries. Therefore, these results do not 
support the liberal thesis that higher tax rates push economic agents into the SE. We are 
able to note that political decentralization, local autonomy, is not significant, which 
implies that increasing the having greater power of decision of local authorities in 
governing issues has no impact on the size of the SE.  
Given the characteristics of the dependent variable (SE), and as a robustness 
analysis, a Tobit model was also estimated yielding results very similar to those 
obtained with the OLS model. The significant variables displayed are the same as in the 
least squares model.  
Potential correlation between the fiscal decentralization measures and random 
disturbances advises caution in the interpretation of the results of the model discussed 
so far. Several techniques have been adopted to deal with this problem. Using 
instrumental variables, the most appropriate approach has probably posed a challenge 
due to the scarcity of time-variant exogenous instruments. When working with panel 
data models affected by endogeneity, we can use fixed or random effect 2SLS methods 
to obtain consistent estimates. The search for the optimal set of instrumental variables 
led us to two alternative random effect estimators: the Balestra and Varadharajan-
Krishnakumar (1987) generalized 2SLS (G2SLS) or the Baltagi (1981) error-component 
2SLS (EC2SLS). The latter is the weighted average of the within and between 2SLS 
estimators, which is shown in Baltagi and Liu (2009) to have more instruments than 
G2SLS and to be more efficient in small samples. These advantages prompted us to use 
the EC2SLS estimator10. 
Following the literature, we use population as the instrumental variable for fiscal 
decentralization (Arikan, 2004; Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010; Alexeev and 
Habodaszova, 2012). We consider population to be an appropriate instrument because it 
is correlated with fiscal decentralization and we assume it to be uncorrelated with the 
random disturbance. 
                                                     
10
See Baltagi and Liu (2009) for further details. 
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The results are similar to the previous ones (Table 2.3). In fact, the only change 
worth noting is that fiscal decentralization in revenues now appears significant and 
shows a negative sign, as does fiscal decentralization in expenditures. Thus, the 
influence of fiscal decentralization on SE is verified. Fiscal decentralization has 
potential as an instrument for countries to control and reduce the size of SE.  
 
Table 2.3: Effects of fiscal decentralization on SE 
 
fd expenditures -2.5803*** -14.9519***
(.8216) (5.5111)
fd revenues -.2018 -4.6921***
(.2060) (1.3671)
tax morale 2.8468 3.3939 2.0305 .9892
(1.6373) (1.8526) (8.8967) (1.7752)
GDP per capita -13.8403*** -14.4102*** -11.1046*** -10.7397***
(2.1046) (2.2086) (4.1553) (3.0171)
ethnic segregation 12.7070 8.7490 18.2551 31.1611***
(11.8073) (13.2796) (61.5054) (13.4892)
urbanisation -5.33e-09 1.15e-09 9.94e-09 -4.77e-08***
(1.17e-08) (1.27e-08) (2.94e-08) (1.60e-08)
self-employed .0101 .0115 .0026 .0151
(.0069) (.0069) (.0106) (.0139)
institutional quality -.1323*** -.0945 -.2622*** -.1960
(.0598) (.0585) (.1122) (.1201)
local autonomy .4843 .3465 .0885 1.5130***
(.6113) (.6867) (3.0480) (.7001)
tiers -1.2543 -1.4070 -1.2944 -.5422
(1.0564) (1.1989) (5.7987) (1.1273)
tax burden -.1200*** -.1157*** -.1648*** -.0941***
(.0252) (.0250) (.0398) (.0489)
corporate tax rate -.0068 -.0101 .0014 .0063
(.0117) (.0116) (.0184) (.0238)
_constant 79.5638*** 80.5465*** 76.5127*** 65.1984***
(11.0175) (11.8138) (33.8524) (14.7481)
Observations 198 198 198 198
Wald chi2 284.92*** 269.01***
F (20,178) 6.13*** 5.73***
Notes: standard deviation in parentheses
Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.01, ***p < 0.01
EC2SLSOLS
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One contribution to the literature of influence of fiscal decentralization on SE will be 
to consider fiscal decentralization in expenditure disaggregated by areas; specifically 
education, health and social protection. These areas of expenditure were selected 
because they are the ones that the public perceives to have the most direct impact on 
their welfare. We believe that when a government spends on education, health or social 
protection, it positively affects the welfare or utility of its citizens, and consequently, it 
will positively influence economic agents to remain in the official economy, 
encouraging the payment of taxes to finance this type of expenditure. The 
decentralization of expenditures benefits the public because local and regional 
authorities are closer to them and have a better understanding of their needs and 
preferences in relation to education, health and social protection.  
First of all, we estimate 3 linear models using panel data; then, taking into account 
the endogeneity problem, we perform two-stage estimation with instrumental variables 
and panel data. As instruments for the decentralization of expenditure in education, 
health and social protection, we use, the same variables lagged one period (for want of 
an alternative). 
Focusing on estimations with instrumental variables, which are considered more 
accurate when dealing with the problem of endogeneity, we can see in Table 2.4 
(columns 5 and 7) how the decentralization of spending on education and social 
protection has a negative effect on the SE, in other words, makes it decrease. This result 
agrees to our expectations, since, if people perceive government spending in a certain 
area to increase their welfare, we might imagine they would be less inclined to work in 
the SE, which would consequently reduce in size. According to fiscal federalism theory, 
fiscal decentralization may help to increase efficiency in the allocation of resources, as 
it is often posited that subnational governments have an information advantage over 
central governments when it comes to responding to the needs and preferences of local 
citizens (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2009). Moreover, decentralization gives sub-
central governments incentives to spend more on education. Several studies conclude 
that decentralization boosts spending on education. Busenmeyer (2008) finds that fiscal 
decentralization affects education spending positively. Rodriguez-Pose and Krojier 
(2009), Gonzalez Alegre (2010), and Grisorio and Prota (2011) all observe that 
decentralization increases current expenditure, which includes education. So, when 
decentralized, spending appears to be more in line with objective indicators of need. 
The simple correlation between PISA results and subcentral government share of 
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spending indeed suggests a positive relationship between decentralization and 
educational outcomes. Simply put, more decentralized countries tend to have better 
student performance (OECD, 2013). In consequence, better students in a country 
implies a country more developed and with more capacity to control SE. So our results 
confirm the fact that more decentralized country spends more in education, which 
implies a country more developed and less SE. 
Other significant variables in these estimations (Table 2.4) are GDP, ethnic 
segregation and local autonomy. Ethnic segregation positively affects SE; and local 
autonomy also has a positive sign. Countries where local governments have a certain 
degree of autonomy in decision-making show higher levels of SE. As already 
mentioned, local governments are more susceptible to corruption and more likely to be 
captured by interest groups, which suggest a positive effect on the SE, in contrast to the 
predictions of Buehn et al. (2013). On the other hand, we find that GDP negatively 
affects the shadow economy. 
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Table 2.4: Effects of disaggregated expenditure on SE 
fd exp. education -0.9704 -4.3472***
(1.1336) (1.7530)
fd exp. health -.2546 -.6166
(.2413) (.4081)
fd exp. social protection -.1917 -1.3524***
(.2883) (.6183)
tax morale 4.2594*** 4.5979 4.7351 2.0944 2.3653 2.0019
(2.1056) (2.4238) (2.4690) (1.2642) (1.2803) (1.1991)
GDP per capita -14.6540*** -16.2015*** -14.5367*** -13.565*** -14.8745*** -14.3829***
(2.4491) (2.4841) (2.6350) (2.2466) (2.2613) (2.2569)
ethnic segregation 16.9947 13.4733 13.3987 32.8333*** 22.4205*** 25.4619***
(16.3064) (18.5524) (18.8996) (10.2756) (9.3566) (8.7711)
urbanisation 1.05e-08 1.24e-08 1.92e-08 -2.01e-08 -2.63e-08*** -2.75e-08***
(1.29e-08) (1.37e-08) (1.38e-08) (1.03e-08) (1.04e-08) (9.96e-09)
self-employed .0094 .0119 .0056 .0052 .0115 .0050
(.0072) (.0067) (.0082) (.0094) (.0092) (.0120)
institutional quality -.0834 -.0631 -.0822 -.1333 -.1566*** -.1941***
(.0585) (.0568) (.0563) (.0799) (.0794) (.0902)
local autonomy .7111 .6014 .4996 1.4225*** 1.2607*** 1.2761***
(.8298) (.9551) (.9713) (.4921) (.4909) (.4586)
tiers -2.1008 -2.2644 -2.3632 -1.3257 -1.0385 -1.1088
(1.5119) (1.7431) (1.7479) (.9105) (.9125) (.8412)
tax burden -.1163*** -.1306*** -.1085*** -.0884*** -.0786*** -.0185
(.0262) (.0250) (.0258) (.0349) (.0331) (.0379)
corporate tax rate -.0145 -.0146 -.0226 -.0033 -.0031 -.0061
(.0116) (.0114) (.0120) (.0155) (.0159) (.0191)
_constant 81.0900*** 87.9984*** 80.3631*** 78.1274*** 81.1075*** 78.9450***
(13.0885) (13.6657) (14.2492) (10.9967) (11.0788) (10.9143)
Observations 175 175 168 174 173 165
Wald chi2 244.16*** 257.90*** 221.96
F test 8.91*** 8.61*** 7.92***
Notes: standard deviation in parentheses
Significance levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01 < p < 0.01, ***p < 0.01
OLS EC2SLS
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2.5 Conclusions 
Almost all governments in the world try to control shadow economic activities both 
because they are partially illegal and because they have an eroding effect on the tax base 
and the viability of the social security system. So one of the big challenges for every 
government is to identify and undertake efficient incentive-oriented policy measures to 
make the shadow economy less attractive, and the official economy more inviting. 
Successful implementation of such policies could help to stabilize, or even reduce, the 
size of shadow economies (Buehn and Schneider, 2012b). This article argues that fiscal 
decentralization should reduce the SE. 
The aim of this study was to examine the impact of fiscal decentralization on SE in a 
sample of 23 OECD countries over the period 1999-2009. In this way, it makes two new 
contributions to the literature: the use of panel data in the analysis; and the use of 
disaggregated indicators of decentralization of expenditure. 
As we have observed in the empirical results, countries with higher levels of fiscal 
decentralization of expenditure show lower levels of shadow economy. More 
decentralized countries are better able to control illegal activities such as SE.  
This study also looks at the effect of fiscal decentralization disaggregated by area of 
expenditure and political decentralization on the shadow economy. According to the 
results obtained, when it comes to combating the shadow economy, the decentralization 
of expenditure on education and social protection have the same impact as the 
aggregated indicator of expenditure. Fiscal decentralization can therefore be considered 
an effective strategy for curbing the growth of SE. However, empirical evidence 
suggests that countries with political decentralization, that is local governments with a 
degree of decision-making autonomy, show higher levels of SE. 
Therefore, in a world where decentralization is an ongoing process, it is necessary to 
continue working on the effects of all forms of decentralization on different economic 
issues, such as SE. In moving forward, it will be important to find more reliable 
instrumental variables for handling the issue of endogeneity. It will also be important to 
further standardize and improve the overall quality of decentralization data, something 
international organizations such as the OECD or the World Bank have talked about 
doing in the past. Moreover, even after 20 years of intensive research, the size, causes, 
and consequences of the shadow economy are still controversially debated in the 
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literature and further research is needed to improve our understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
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Appendix      Table A2.1: Size of shadow economy11
 
                                                     
11
 Estimations before 2007 are taken from Buehn and Schneider (2012) 
*Data for 2009 and 2010 are not available; therefore, estimations are a linear interpolation of the national average for 2008. 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean
Australia 0.144 0.143 0.143 0.141 0.139 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.132 0.132 0.1
Austria 0.1 0.098 0.097 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.096 0.097 0.095 0.095 0.1
Belgium 0.227 0.222 0.221 0.22 0.22 0.218 0.218 0.214 0.208 0.203 0.203 0.2
Canada 0.163 0.16 0.159 0.158 0.157 0.156 0.155 0.153 0.152 0.149 0.149 0.2
Denmark 0.184 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.178 0.176 0.17 0.165 0.153 0.153 0.2
Finland 0.184 0.181 0.179 0.178 0.177 0.176 0.174 0.171 0.166 0.164 0.164 0.2
France 0.157 0.152 0.15 0.151 0.15 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.145 0.14 0.14 0.1
Germany 0.164 0.16 0.159 0.161 0.163 0.161 0.16 0.156 0.153 0.148 0.148 0.2
Hungary 0.254 0.251 0.248 0.245 0.244 0.241 0.24 0.237 0.237 0.231 0.231 0.2
Iceland 0.16 0.159 0.158 0.16 0.159 0.155 0.151 0.15 0.144 0.138 0.138 0.2
Ireland 0.161 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.16 0.158 0.156 0.155 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.2
Italy 0.278 0.271 0.267 0.268 0.27 0.27 0.271 0.269 0.268 0.267 0.267 0.3
Luxembourg 0.1 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.097 0.096 0.093 0.091 0.091 0.1
Mexico 0.308 0.301 0.303 0.304 0.305 0.301 0.299 0.292 0.288 0.3 0.3 0.3
Netherlands 0.133 0.131 0.131 0.132 0.133 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.131 0.127 0.127 0.1
Norway 0.192 0.191 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.185 0.185 0.182 0.181 0.177 0.177 0.2
Poland 0.277 0.276 0.277 0.277 0.275 0.273 0.269 0.264 0.254 0.247 0.247 0.3
Portugal 0.23 0.227 0.226 0.227 0.23 0.231 0.233 0.232 0.225 0.219 0.219 0.2
Spain 0.23 0.227 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.225 0.224 0.224 0.223 0.229 0.229 0.2
Sweden 0.196 0.192 0.191 0.19 0.187 0.185 0.186 0.182 0.18 0.177 0.177 0.2
Switzerland 0.088 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.088 0.086 0.085 0.083 0.08 0.072 0.072 0.1
United Kingdom 0.128 0.127 0.126 0.126 0.125 0.124 0.124 0.123 0.124 0.121 0.121 0.1
United States 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.1
Mean (23 OECD countries) 0.180 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.176 0.175 0.174 0.172 0.169 0.166 0.166 0.174
Source: Buehn and Schneider (2013)
Year
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Table A2.2: Fiscal decentralization of total expenditure in OECD countries, 1999-2009 
 
 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean
Australia 0.401 0.401 0.383 0.377 0.381 0.380 0.378 0.384 0.387 0.387 0.375 0.385
Austria 0.440 0.441 0.410 0.407 0.408 0.401 0.405 0.418 0.422 0.432 0.454 0.422
Belgium 0.430 0.432 0.435 0.467 0.465 0.482 0.479 0.483 0.479 0.482 0.485 0.465
Canada 0.608 0.613 0.623 0.624 0.624 0.627 0.631 0.614 0.615 0.616 0.615 0.619
Denmark 0.504 0.499 0.505 0.512 0.522 0.524 0.530 0.541 0.495 0.495 0.488 0.510
Finland 0.465 0.471 0.483 0.478 0.483 0.489 0.491 0.490 0.497 0.496 0.357 0.473
France 0.283 0.290 0.291 0.297 0.303 0.317 0.321 0.327 0.339 0.342 0.342 0.314
Germay 0.656 0.661 0.671 0.672 0.667 0.668 0.666 0.665 0.667 0.669 0.663 0.666
Hungary 0.273 0.281 0.289 0.286 0.302 0.326 0.332 0.310 0.302 0.294 0.297 0.299
Iceland 0.292 0.302 0.302 0.304 0.308 0.310 0.309 0.338 0.338 0.246 0.310 0.305
Ireland 0.269 0.291 0.296 0.306 0.307 0.311 0.317 0.143 0.138 0.137 0.127 0.240
Italy 0.361 0.372 0.373 0.385 0.385 0.400 0.399 0.397 0.400 0.405 0.398 0.389
Luxembourg 0.200 0.202 0.202 0.200 0.193 0.182 0.181 0.185 0.186 0.186 0.179 0.191
Mexico 0.363 0.366 0.386 0.406 0.416 0.430 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.418
Netherlands 0.384 0.388 0.385 0.394 0.398 0.404 0.403 0.392 0.391 0.387 0.381 0.392
Norway 0.338 0.323 0.333 0.268 0.273 0.269 0.271 0.276 0.284 0.291 0.283 0.292
Poland 0.431 0.419 0.408 0.426 0.370 0.383 0.384 0.387 0.387 0.390 0.408 0.399
Portugal 0.147 0.155 0.160 0.169 0.161 0.173 0.176 0.178 0.185 0.188 0.185 0.171
Spain 0.454 0.473 0.479 0.541 0.565 0.565 0.580 0.587 0.591 0.595 0.577 0.546
Sweden 0.447 0.453 0.447 0.457 0.456 0.454 0.446 0.485 0.502 0.519 0.520 0.471
Switzerland 0.661 0.661 0.719 0.722 0.735 0.747 0.757 0.950 0.800 0.921 0.901 0.780
United Kingdom 0.221 0.221 0.233 0.233 0.230 0.234 0.233 0.236 0.237 0.230 0.227 0.230
United States 0.578 0.583 0.600 0.601 0.595 0.596 0.594 0.564 0.565 0.552 0.530 0.578
Mean 0.400 0.404 0.409 0.414 0.415 0.421 0.423 0.426 0.420 0.422 0.415 0.415
Source: own elaboration from Government Finance Statistics (IMF)
Year
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Table A2.3: Fiscal decentralization of total revenues in OECD countries, 1999-2009  
 
  
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean
Australia 0.406 0.394 0.382 0.388 0.382 0.385 0.379 0.380 0.382 0.373 0.397 0.386
Austria 0.475 0.470 0.430 0.433 0.438 0.422 0.431 0.440 0.433 0.446 0.478 0.445
Belgium 0.452 0.439 0.456 0.466 0.462 0.484 0.484 0.489 0.497 0.498 0.466 0.472
Canada 0.616 0.620 0.619 0.628 0.628 0.630 0.635 0.601 0.662 0.676 0.574 0.626
Denmark 0.490 0.495 0.507 0.511 0.517 0.506 0.508 0.496 0.460 0.469 0.482 0.495
Finland 0.477 0.440 0.462 0.465 0.475 0.478 0.481 0.479 0.471 0.487 0.367 0.462
France 0.325 0.334 0.331 0.344 0.356 0.358 0.364 0.364 0.377 0.382 0.353 0.353
Germay 0.686 0.685 0.687 0.692 0.687 0.708 0.696 0.693 0.688 0.686 0.632 0.685
Hungary 0.300 0.309 0.330 0.347 0.356 0.371 0.377 0.390 0.342 0.316 0.281 0.338
Iceland 0.293 0.303 0.314 0.325 0.331 0.341 0.351 0.333 0.344 0.345 0.306 0.326
Ireland 0.288 0.293 0.326 0.346 0.351 0.341 0.196 0.182 0.190 0.206 0.175 0.263
Italy 0.380 0.410 0.417 0.424 0.428 0.444 0.449 0.428 0.433 0.440 0.402 0.423
Luxembourg 0.212 0.207 0.217 0.231 0.232 0.220 0.211 0.205 0.202 0.217 0.212 0.215
Mexico 0.408 0.400 0.429 0.464 0.493 0.533 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.517
Netherlands 0.394 0.392 0.387 0.399 0.425 0.417 0.399 0.383 0.385 0.380 0.387 0.395
Norway 0.255 0.246 0.260 0.236 0.231 0.217 0.202 0.197 0.199 0.187 0.279 0.228
Poland 0.338 0.331 0.431 0.438 0.461 0.480 0.457 0.463 0.444 0.464 0.442 0.432
Portugal 0.196 0.184 0.199 0.199 0.198 0.217 0.226 0.206 0.206 0.213 0.173 0.201
Spain 0.537 0.544 0.543 0.566 0.576 0.591 0.584 0.585 0.576 0.628 0.564 0.572
Sweden 0.430 0.460 0.425 0.465 0.463 0.462 0.457 0.451 0.454 0.473 0.524 0.460
Switzerland 0.699 0.670 0.744 0.737 0.739 0.735 0.736 0.942 1.017 0.897 2.477 0.945
United Kingdom 0.219 0.216 0.232 0.246 0.263 0.259 0.254 0.255 0.254 0.253 0.235 0.244
United States 0.604 0.596 0.601 0.649 0.661 0.657 0.633 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.541 0.450
Mean 0.412 0.410 0.423 0.435 0.441 0.446 0.439 0.416 0.418 0.419 0.493 0.432
Source: Author's own calculations from Government Finance Statistics (IMF)
Year
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Table A2.4: Fiscal decentralization of expenditure on education (OECD countries, 1999-2009) 
 
  
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean
Australia 0.613 0.610 0.604 0.607 0.606 0.599 0.601 0.595 0.596 0.594 0.564 0.599
Austria 0.454 0.450 0.435 0.440 0.446 0.376 0.357 0.458 0.457 0.467 0.477 0.438
Belgium 0.873 0.868 0.865 0.862 0.857 0.852 0.848 0.850 0.847 0.843 0.857
Canada 0.943 0.943 0.948 0.950 0.950 0.954 0.957 0.946 0.957 0.950
Denmark 0.490 0.494 0.509 0.514 0.524 0.510 0.514 0.579 0.505 0.493 0.492 0.511
Finland 0.519 0.515 0.512 0.572 0.578 0.581 0.597 0.544 0.549 0.552
France 0.265 0.264 0.272 0.275 0.282 0.275 0.279 0.284 0.288 0.293 0.297 0.279
Germany 0.974 0.973 0.972 0.971 0.969 0.969 0.965 0.962 0.959 0.955 0.952 0.966
Hungary 0.617 0.614 0.610 0.608 0.601 0.597 0.592 0.499 0.480 0.487 0.570
Iceland 0.555 0.572 0.554 0.543 0.541 0.537 0.528 0.600 0.600 0.591 0.587 0.564
Ireland 0.213 0.212 0.233 0.219 0.207 0.208 0.207 0.188 0.194 0.190 0.207
Italy 0.299 0.272 0.276 0.285 0.280 0.296 0.302 0.259 0.256 0.266 0.279
Luxembourg 0.179 0.176 0.233 0.250 0.251 0.253 0.259 0.266 0.272 0.278 0.284 0.246
Mexico
Netherlands 0.469 0.466 0.477 0.479 0.480 0.483 0.487 0.490 0.499 0.503 0.502 0.485
Norway 0.622 0.625 0.629 0.633 0.628 0.635 0.645 0.644 0.657 0.656 0.665 0.640
Poland 0.468 0.483 0.483 0.488 0.489 0.487 0.484 0.484 0.482 0.487 0.496 0.485
Portugal 0.091 0.086 0.080 0.080 0.071 0.070 0.063 0.093 0.101 0.103 0.105 0.086
Spain 0.739 0.929 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.935 0.937 0.963 0.965 0.965 0.971 0.928
Sweden 0.715 0.704 0.656 0.698 0.707 0.684 0.676 0.711 0.746 0.755 0.705
Switzerland 0.899 0.903 0.905 0.889 0.885 0.881 0.875 0.923 0.895
United Kingdom
United States 0.942 0.944 0.941 0.938 0.935 0.933 0.936 0.916 0.920 0.918 0.891 0.928
Mean 0.569 0.576 0.578 0.583 0.582 0.577 0.577 0.566 0.566 0.567 0.560 0.573
Source: Author's own calculations from Government Finance Statistics (IMF)
Year
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Table A2.5: Fiscal decentralization of expenditure on health (OECD countries, 1999-2009) 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean
Australia 0.479 0.480 0.471 0.475 0.482 0.475 0.471 0.484 0.491 0.488 0.485 0.480
Austria 0.808 0.753 0.651 0.680 0.662 0.675 0.367 0.370 0.376 0.379 0.572
Belgium 0.276 0.285 0.319 0.309 0.363 0.394 0.432 0.049 0.050 0.052 0.253
Canada 0.974 0.950 0.958 0.958 0.927 0.808 0.823 0.818 0.812 0.892
Denmark 0.965 0.964 0.965 0.953 0.956 0.958 0.955 0.966 0.982 0.981 0.980 0.966
Finland 0.725 0.721 0.723 0.719 0.711 0.696 0.690 0.609 0.604 0.689
France 0.255 0.266 0.313 0.252 0.250 0.179 0.160 0.141 0.121 0.102 0.204
Germany 0.250 0.303 0.488 0.689 0.968 0.977 0.980 0.983 0.986 0.989 0.993 0.782
Hungary 0.731 0.729 0.733 0.724 0.710 0.705 0.699 0.693 0.688 0.682 0.676 0.706
Iceland 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.016
Ireland 0.507 0.503 0.501 0.499 0.500 0.496 0.494 0.492 0.490 0.489 0.487 0.496
Italy 0.586 0.632 0.598 0.706 0.720 0.725 0.627 0.691 0.666 0.652 0.660
Luxembourg 0.183 0.094 0.084 0.054 0.030 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.050
Mexico
Netherlands 0.668 0.662 0.652 0.640 0.643 0.672 0.086 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.041 0.382
Norway 0.717 0.625 0.628 0.302 0.296 0.279 0.269 0.269 0.266 0.263 0.270 0.380
Poland 0.133 0.097 0.466 0.728 0.689 0.798 0.802 0.806 0.809 0.813 0.816 0.632
Portugal 0.048 0.044 0.041 0.050 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.046
Spain 0.838 0.923 0.922 0.943 0.949 0.953 0.949 0.928 0.929 0.931 0.935 0.927
Sweden 0.868 0.866 0.656 0.864 0.850 0.840 0.797 0.842 0.834 0.826 0.824
Switzerland 0.988 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.992 0.994 0.997 0.967 0.988
United Kingdom
United States 0.618 0.619 0.611 0.596 0.580 0.582 0.593 0.417 0.423 0.418 0.400 0.533
Mean 0.554 0.549 0.561 0.578 0.587 0.585 0.545 0.484 0.483 0.482 0.467 0.534
Source: Author's own calculations from Government Finance Statistics (IMF)
Year
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Table A2.6: Fiscal decentralization of expenditure on social protection (OECD countries, 1999-2009) 
 
 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean
Australia 0.095 0.092 0.091 0.097 0.104 0.099 0.102 0.107 0.112 0.116 0.102 0.101
Austria 0.252 0.261 0.239 0.228 0.225 0.234 0.146 0.150 0.152 0.151 0.204
Belgium 0.597 0.602 0.608 0.620 0.351 0.288 0.219 0.200 0.199 0.201 0.389
Canada 0.469 0.497 0.496 0.499 0.504 0.512 0.515 0.335 0.334 0.462
Denmark 0.635 0.628 0.627 0.631 0.634 0.642 0.646 0.566 0.569 0.577 0.575 0.612
Finland 0.643 0.649 0.667 0.636 0.638 0.637 0.576 0.215 0.222 0.542
France 0.216 0.199 0.196 0.215 0.240 0.305 0.309 0.240
Germany 0.383 0.391 0.411 0.431 0.441 0.444 0.435 0.420
Hungary 0.322 0.319 0.331 0.312 0.285 0.234 0.202 0.082 0.082 0.080 0.225
Iceland 0.546 0.561 0.507 0.567 0.584 0.599 0.617 0.247 0.244 0.240 0.221 0.448
Ireland 0.142 0.205 0.226 0.250 0.226 0.229 0.230 0.053 0.053 0.060 0.167
Italy 0.112 0.103 0.113 0.115 0.123 0.112 0.113 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.090
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands 0.334 0.340 0.307 0.281 0.263 0.258 0.327 0.117 0.124 0.120 0.121 0.236
Norway 0.192 0.189 0.204 0.205 0.187 0.179 0.188 0.194 0.203 0.210 0.209 0.196
Poland 0.897 0.886 0.605 0.295 0.291 0.313 0.327 0.102 0.101 0.100 0.097 0.365
Portugal 0.081 0.101 0.133 0.127 0.140 0.147 0.221 0.033 0.032 0.029 0.026 0.097
Spain 0.333 0.587 0.614 0.643 0.669 0.671 0.818 0.106 0.107 0.109 0.105 0.433
Sweden 0.416 0.524 0.635 0.388 0.370 0.381 0.362 0.277 0.419
Switzerland 0.576 0.578 0.900 0.885 0.824 0.899 0.289 0.292 0.284 0.614
United Kingdom 0.211 0.211 0.210 0.211
United States 0.575 0.587 0.614 0.603 0.602 0.601 0.595 0.141 0.138 0.132 0.115 0.427
Mean 0.391 0.415 0.426 0.401 0.385 0.389 0.378 0.182 0.178 0.166 0.172 0.317
Source: Author's own calculations from Government Finance Statistics (IMF)
Year
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Table A2.7: Control variables 
 
 
   
Variables Units and definition Source
GDP per capita Gross domestic product, in 2005 $  (in logs) World Development Indicators, World Bank
Ethnic segregation Index of ethnic segregation calculated by Alesina and Zhuravskaya Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011)
Urbanisation Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. World Development Indicators, World Bank
Self-employed Self-employed, total (% of total employed) World Development Indicators, World Bank
Institutional quality The average of three indicators of governance. These three indicators are: World Development Indicators, World Bank
  Government Effectiveness  captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its degree 
  of independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
  government's commitment to such policies. 
  Control of Corruption  captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.
  Rule of Law  captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.
Local autonomy Dummy variable for countries whose local governments have some degree of ―autonomy‖ in some specific areas of governance Daniel Treisman, Decentralization Dataset, 2008
and whether the constitution grants exclusive power of decision on this issue
Tiers Number of vertical tiers of government Daniel Treisman, Decentralization Dataset, 2008
Tax burden Tax revenue (% of GDP) World Development Indicators, World Bank
Corporate tax rate Highest marginal corporate tax rate OECD
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Chapter 3 
Why are some Spanish regions more resilient 
than others? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Resilience is a relatively new term in economics. Although the concept has been used 
for some time in the physical, engineering and ecological sciences, it has only very 
recently attracted attention from regional analysts, spatial economists and economic 
geographers and has grown in popularity since the last international economic crisis. 
Reggiani et al. (2002) argued that the notion of ―resilience‖ should be a key factor in the 
exploration of spatial economic dynamics; especially in as far as it determines how well 
such systems respond to shocks, disturbances and perturbations. In broad terms, the 
basic idea is that different degrees of resilience explain variation in economic growth 
trends across the regions of a country (Fingleton et al., 2012; Martin, 2012). 
Although there is no universally-shared definition of regional economic resilience, 
there are three main ways of interpreting the concept: engineering resilience, ecological 
resilience, and adaptive resilience. Probably the most frequently invoked meaning or 
definition is that of so-called ―engineering resilience‖, which focuses on the system‘s 
resistance to disturbances (shocks) and its speed of return to the pre-shock state. Many 
discussions assume the system to be in ―equilibrium‖ prior to the shock, and define 
resilience in terms of stability around the equilibrium point, or steady state (e.g. Holling, 
1973; Pimm, 1984; Walker et al., 2004). ―Engineering‖ resilience could therefore be 
defined as the ability of a system to return to its assumed point of equilibrium or recover 
its configuration following a shock or disturbance. It focuses on resistance to shocks 
and stability around equilibrium. The field of ecology, however, has provided a second 
perspective, known as ―ecological resilience‖, which focuses on the role of shocks or 
disturbances in pushing a system beyond its ―elasticity threshold‖ to a new domain. In 
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this case, resilience is measured by the magnitude of disturbance or shock that can be 
absorbed before the system changes form, function, or position (Holling, 1973). 
According to this definition, systems are characterised by multiple stability domains, 
and, if a shock pushes a system beyond the ―elasticity threshold‖ for its existing domain 
or state, it may move to a different domain or state. Finally, ―adaptive resilience‖ is 
defined as the ability of a system to undergo anticipatory or reactionary reorganisation 
of form and/or function so as to minimise the impact of a destabilizing shock (Martin, 
2012). 
These different interpretations of resilience suggest, therefore, that this concept 
encompasses four interrelated dimensions: resistance, recovery, re-orientation and 
renewal (Martin, 2012). Resistance is the vulnerability or sensitivity of a regional 
economy to disturbances and disruptions, such as recessions. Recovery refers to the 
speed and degree of recovery from such a disruption. Re-orientation concerns the extent 
to which the regional economy undergoes structural re-orientation and the resulting 
implications for jobs and incomes. Renewal is the degree of renewal or resumption of 
the growth path that characterised the regional economy prior to the shock. These 
different aspects of regional economic resilience may clearly interact in different ways 
and lead to different outcomes. 
Given our interest in analysing regional characteristics that might influence regional 
resilience, we begin by constructing a composite index of resilience for the 17 regions 
of Spain over the period 1980 to 2015, using the DEA approach. In addition to this 
characterisation, a further objective of this study is to compare our resilience indicator 
with those formulated by Martin (2012) and used in most studies on resilience 
(Sánchez, 2012; Di Caro, 2014, Lagravinese, 2014). Thus, we aim to determine whether 
our indicator performs the same as those of Martin (2012) by observing whether 
regional resilience scores vary according to which indicator is used to evaluate them. 
Multiple Factor Analysis (MFA) is used to characterise regions by their resilience. This 
is a novel use of this methodology in papers of this kind, and one which allows the 
simultaneous analysis of groups of different partial indicators measured at different 
points in time. 
We study the case of the Spanish regions because, in our view, they present an 
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interesting example of regional differences in terms of GDP or employment, for 
example, during times of crisis. The most densely populated regions, i.e. Cataluña, 
Andalucía, Madrid and Valencia, determine the overall pattern. At the same time, 
numerous regions, such as Galicia and Asturias, are unable to maintain the pace set by 
this more dynamic group. Moreover, last economic crisis left Spain among the countries 
hardest hit by rising unemployment. According to Cuadrado-Roura and Maroto (2015), 
the recent economic and financial crisis had a significant and particularly adverse 
impact on Spain, heavily affecting all regions, albeit with notable differences. The aim 
of this article, therefore, is to analyse the resilience patterns of Spanish regions, 
focusing on production specialisation and public, human and social capital as 
explanatory factors. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two offers a review of the literature on 
resilience. Section three describes the methodology and results of the composite index 
of resilience and MFA. Section four provides the main conclusions. 
 
3.2 Review of literature  
Most studies have focused on how different factors have impinged on the different 
levels of adaptability and resilience shown by regions of Europe. Martin (2012), for 
example, compares three British crises (1979-1983; 1990-1993; 2008-2010), 
underlining the importance of local economic structures in regional resilience. His 
analysis is confined to movements in employment rather than output. Employment 
tends to take much longer than output to recover from a recession, and is thus arguably 
the more critical variable, since a major decline in employment in a region or area can 
have profound consequences for the local labour market. A regional or local economy 
may resume output growth following a recession without achieving a similar recovery 
in employment, thereby creating major problems of adjustment for the local 
unemployed population. The extent and manner in which regional employment 
rebounds following a recession is thus arguably more insightful as an indicator of 
regional economic resilience. 
Focusing on European regions at the NUTS 2 level, Brakman et al. (2014) analyse 
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the relevance of two possible determinants of regional resilience to shocks: the degree 
of urbanisation and specialisation. They take the Great Recession, the economic and 
financial crisis that began in 2008, as their shock and explore how the resilience of EU 
NUTS 2 regions varies with the unemployment rate and real per capita GDP. Their 
findings show that EU regions with a relatively large share of the population living in 
commuting areas, in combination with specialisation in medium high-tech industries, 
are relatively resilient, that is, less affected by the crisis. This result suggests a link with 
international trade.  
In examining the resilience of Spanish regions, Sánchez et al. (2014) try to identify 
the factors behind regional resilience in rural areas of Andalucía for two time periods 
(2000-2008 and 2008-2012). Their two-period design enables them to use DEA to 
identify areas with changes in their resilience patterns and determine the impact of a 
wide range of regional factors. Their results show the agricultural sector as one of the 
best at resisting the impact of a crisis. Rural areas with more diversified economic and 
productive activities, held up mainly by the building sector, performed best during the 
economic boom. 
Meanwhile, Rosell et al. (2011) seek to determine the impact of different factors on 
the degree of resilience of the Catalan territories during the last crisis. Their results 
indicate that business density, sectoral specialisation, the percentage of foreign 
population, and rurality impact on the resilience levels of these territories. Finally, 
Marrades (2011) assesses regional resilience for Spanish regions using a composite 
indicator. His point is that focusing on employment changes may be the best option for 
understanding how regions become resilient to exogenous shocks. As far as the 
resistance and recovery dimensions of resilience are concerned, a focus on employment 
is justified by the fact that it is less elastic than output when a crisis occurs. The results 
obtained by Marrades show the top scorers in the 1979 recession to have been Rioja, 
Navarra, Murcia, Galicia, Baleares, and Extremadura; and the top five in the 1991 
recession to have been Rioja, Navarra, Madrid, Canarias and Baleares.  
Regional resilience to economic shocks is the result of two combined factors: 
regional shock-resistance and subsequent ‗recovery‘ capabilities (Lagravinese, 2014; 
Martin, 2012). The resilience of the various regions will vary according to their 
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characteristics. Martin and Sunley (2014) identify three main sets of factors: contextual, 
compositional and collective. Contextual factors refer to how local and regional agents 
are embedded within and affected by wider-scale national-level institutions and policies, 
and even international networks and the global division of labour. Compositional 
factors make reference to the sectoral/industrial structure of local and regional 
economies. Collective factors include the characteristics of and relationships between 
local economic agents within each regional economy. 
The economic literature has identified numerous quantitative features of regional 
economies that shape their ability to resist and adapt to shocks and change (Crescenzi, 
2009; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011). Two key sub-dimensions influencing 
regional resistance are the regional industry mix, and a group of regional 
competitiveness/innovation factors. The regional industry mix, i.e. the sectoral structure 
of the regional economy, is a key factor in determining regional crisis resistance. 
‗Conventionally, […] manufacturing and construction industries have been viewed as 
being more cyclically sensitive than private service industries, and the latter more 
sensitive than public sector services, which are often assumed to be largely immune to 
economic recessions‘ (Martin, 2012: 13). Regional sensitivity is the result of the 
combination of these sectoral sensitivities ‗weighted‘ by the shares of these sectors in 
the regional economy, influencing the adjustment of the regional economy, its output 
and employment to cyclical shocks. 
Regional specialisation has also played a decisive part in how regions across Europe 
have weathered the crisis. Possibly most of the impact was felt by the building sector. 
Spanish coastal areas, which had thrived during the economic boom years thanks to the 
construction and sale of second homes, are a clear example of the construction-led bust. 
Construction was among the first and hardest hit sectors with value-added for this sector 
falling between 6 and 20% -and employment between 10 and 20%-especially in 
countries such as Ireland, Latvia, Estonia, Portugal, Greece and Spain, all of which had 
experienced property bubbles during the pre-crisis period. Industry as a whole also 
declined by more than 2% across the EU between 2007 and 2011. Behind this average, 
however, lie declines of more than 5% in the seven member states most severely 
affected by the crisis. 
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Industrial variety spreads risks across a region and can better accommodate 
idiosyncratic, sector-specific shocks (Dissart, 2003; Essletzbichler, 2007; Davies and 
Tonts, 2010; Desrochers and Leppala, 2011). Regional variety in skills-based industries 
is expected to enable speedier recovery from sector-specific shocks, as it is easier for 
redundant employees to find new jobs in a region with skills-based industries in which 
their skills are still found relevant (Diodato and Weterings, 2014). As well as preventing 
the destruction of regional human capital, this stems the outflow of highly-skilled 
workers to other regions. Specialised regions have few potential sources of renewal and 
diversification and their ability to diversify along new growth paths might be hampered 
by their specialised industrial structure (Boschma and Lambooy, 1999; Hassink, 2005; 
Martin and Sunley, 2006). 
Another subset of regional factors likely to shape the ability to react to external 
shocks has to do with the determinants of regional competitiveness. The accumulation 
of human capital and the allocation of (public and/or private) resources to R&D 
activities are long-term structural characteristics of regional economies that are slow to 
adjust. They shape local growth trajectories through two key channels. First, both 
regional human capital and innovation efforts are crucially linked with the capability of 
the local economy not only to generate new knowledge but also to absorb new, 
externally generated ideas and cognitions (Crescenzi, 2009; Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2011). Regional human capital is positively and significantly associated with 
economic performance during the crisis, whereas R&D intensity is negatively linked to 
short-term economic performance. The existing evidence on the long-term growth and 
innovation dynamics of the EU regions (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008) has shown that local R&D investments have a 
weak association with regional innovation and growth, while human capital is a stronger 
predictor of long-term regional growth and innovation. It is human capital endowment 
that can provide the flexibility and creativity required to respond to negative shocks.  
When a country is hit by an economic crisis, flexibility, creativity and innovation are 
the factors that determine how its regions perform in, for example, the skills level of the 
workforce. A better-educated workforce facilitates the generation, assimilation and 
absorption of innovation, as well as short-term adaptation and medium-term adaptability 
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to new challenges (OECD, 2011). 
 
3.3 Methodology and results 
 
3.3.1 Construction of a Composite Index of Resilience  
 
Our first objective of this study is to develop a composite index of resilience. As in 
previous papers, we consider the best factors to explain a region‘s response and 
recovery capacity to be employment and GDP. These two key variables in economic 
development and public well-being and quality of life, will therefore be used to 
construct the index. 
 We will focus on Spanish NUTS 2 regions, using data from the INE (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística - National Institute of Statistics) and BD.MORES (Base de 
datos regionales de la economía española, Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones 
Públicas - the regional economic database of the ministry of the treasury and public 
administration). The data are GDP at constant market prices and employment figures for 
the period 1980-2015.  
We analyse the trajectory of the Spanish regions from 1980 to 2015 in order to 
identify their ability to cope with and recover from the impact of successive economic 
crises during the period analysed.  We consider 7 periods of analysis (Table 3.1), as 
specified by the Spanish Business Cycle Dating Committee (Spanish Economic 
Association, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona), who construct an index of economic 
activity to determine the dates of peaks and troughs in economic activity in Spain. The 
CF index of economic activity (CF stands for Comité de Fechado, i.e., dating 
committee) pools data from several sources to extract the latent level of economic 
activity in real time. Specifically, they include the following economic indicators: Gross 
Domestic Product or GDP, Industrial Production Index, Employment, Purchasing 
Managers Index or PMI, Indicator of activity in the services sector, Economic sentiment 
index or ESI, Consumer confidence index. 
The CF index combines information from the list of series detailed above using a 
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dynamic factor model (e.g., Camacho, Pérez-Quirós and Poncela, 2013). The model 
specification allows for simultaneous quarterly and monthly observations, as well as the 
interpolation of data as yet unreleased. The dynamic factor model combines all this 
information to generate a unique latent index of economic activity
12
. 
         
 Table 3.1: Periods of analysis 
 
Figure 3.1, shown below, depicts the evolution of GDP and employment for Spain.  
The 1992 recession is the one that perhaps best fits the mold of a typical recession. It 
is preceded and followed by two relatively lengthy expansions and therefore leaves 
room for little ambiguity. Economic growth picked up pace around 1986 when Spain 
joined the European Union. By 1992, a number of factors probably conspired against 
the momentum of the previous six years. The Gulf war adversely affected oil prices and 
has to be considered one of the propellants behind the U.S. recession of 1990 to 1991. 
Meanwhile, in Japan, the property boom went bust, sinking its economy into a 
seemingly never-ending cycle of deleveraging. A number of countries in Europe would 
be caught in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992, which led several 
countries, including Spain, into significant currency devaluations.  
Since 2008, both the domestic and international economic landscapes have been 
grim. The recession that started in 2008 was followed by a full blown financial crisis of 
international proportions. Within the Eurozone, things were further complicated by a 
sluggishly-evolving institutional structure and a sovereign debt crisis. These factors 
                                                     
12
 For more details, http://asesec.org/CFCweb/en/ 
Period 1 Recovery 1980-1991
Period 2 Crisis 1992-1993
Period 3 Recovery 1994-2007
Period 4 Crisis 2008-2009
Period 5 Recovery 2010
Period 6 Crisis 2011-2013
Period 7 Recovery 2014-2015
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hinder the dating of the end of the recession that began in 2008. However, a closer look 
at the Spanish economic trend during this period reveals some improvement by the end 
of 2009. The subsequent recovery, while very gradual, was visible in the two largest 
sectors of the economy: the industrial and services sectors. It can therefore be 
considered to peak in 2010, the year that marked the start of the second period of 
recession leading to the trough of 2013.  
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Figure 3.1:  GDP and employment trends (indexes, 1980=100; 1980-2015) 
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Using GDP and employment data, we apply the methodology used by Martin (2012) 
to develop an indicator of resistance to a crisis, for employment and for GDP, and an 
index of recovery from a crisis. The index is the ratio of change in employment or 
output in a particular region to the corresponding change nationwide. The majority of 
papers on this topic analyse regional resilience levels based on GDP per capita or 
employment data, using the Martin index. Such is the case of Sánchez (2012), 
Lagravinese (2014) or Di Caro (2014). 
This paper calculates individual regional GDP and employment growth rates for each 
sample period (Tables A1 and A2) and uses the results to compute indicators of 
resistance to the economic crisis and capacity to face the recovery stages. 
 
Index Employrt = (ΔErt/Ert) / (ΔENt/ENt)  (3.1) 
 
where ΔErt/Ert is the change in employment for region r in period t, and ΔENt/ENt is the 
change in employment in period t for the country as a whole. 
 
Index GDPrt = (ΔGDPrt/GDPrt) / (ΔGDPNt/GDPNt) (3.2) 
 
where ΔGDPr/GDPr is the change in GDP for region r in period t, and ΔGDPNt/GDPNt is 
the change in GDP in the period t for the country as a whole. 
Given that the indicators are quotients, their interpretation changes according to 
whether the quotient is positive or negative. They therefore need to be normalised for 
the sake of uniform interpretation. Normalisation for a positive national growth rate is 
as follows: 
Example:  
Pr(1977 85) Pr(1977 85)*
Pr
Pr(1977 85) Pr(1977 85)
( )
(1977 85)
( ) ( )
GD GD
GD
GD GD
C Min C
C
Max C Min C
 
 

 

  
Normalisation for a negative national growth rate is given below: 
Example:  
r(1977 85) r(1977 85)*
r
r(1977 85) r(1977 85)
( )
(1977 85) 1
( ) ( )
employ employ
employ
employ employ
C Min C
C
Max C Min C
 
 
 
     
 
Thus, normalised indicators take values between 0 and 1 and are interpreted as: the 
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greater the indicator, that is, the closer it is to 1, the greater the level of resilience or 
recovery capacity. Conversely, the smaller the indicator, that is, the closer it is to zero, 
the lower the level of resistance or recovery capacity (Tables 2 and 3). 
Table 3.2: Crisis indexes 
 
CGDPr Cemployr CGDPr Cemployr CGDPr Cemployr
Andalucía 0.328 0.000 0.856 0.411 0.510 0.106
Aragón 0.631 0.675 0.753 0.512 0.652 0.253
Asturias 0.000 0.536 0.129 0.520 0.000 0.115
Baleares 0.680 0.851 0.583 0.677 1.000 1.000
Canarias 1.000 0.576 0.559 0.324 0.952 0.365
Cantabria 0.297 1.000 0.645 0.808 0.255 0.168
Castilla y León 0.884 0.941 0.953 0.782 0.303 0.124
Castilla La Mancha 0.282 0.609 0.884 0.553 0.463 0.000
Cataluña 0.520 0.265 0.514 0.256 0.744 0.166
Valencia 0.543 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.545 0.261
Extremadura 0.506 0.548 0.987 0.765 0.635 0.019
Galicia 0.654 0.978 0.537 1.000 0.635 0.147
Madrid 0.635 0.460 1.000 0.870 0.946 0.288
Murcia 0.375 0.911 0.845 0.173 0.732 0.338
Navarra 0.466 0.619 0.350 0.944 0.578 0.158
País Vasco 0.641 0.774 0.020 0.662 0.637 0.059
La Rioja 0.534 0.863 0.327 0.812 0.298 0.188
1992-93 2008-09 2011-13
CRISIS
 
 
97 
 
Table 3.3: Recovery indexes 
 
These indicators could be used to identify each region‘s performance on the GDP 
and employment indicator, but our aim here is to gather the information given by these 
two indicators into a composite indicator that will measure their resilience in terms both 
of GDP and employment. 
Given the scatter plots obtained (Figure 3.2), we consider both variables to be useful 
for explaining regional performance patterns, because, although they are positively 
correlated, there are differences between the two. We therefore use GDP and 
employment to compute our resilience index. 
RGDPr Remployr RGDPr Remployr RGDPr Remployr RGDPr Remployr
Andalucía 0.835 0.854 0.554 0.779 0.008 0.442 0.726 0.761
Aragón 0.491 0.565 0.321 0.352 0.832 0.140 0.224 0.632
Asturias 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.078 0.446 0.198 0.650 0.001
Baleares 0.864 0.869 0.099 0.996 0.191 0.583 0.828 0.831
Canarias 0.380 0.743 0.638 0.855 0.410 0.377 0.319 1.000
Cantabria 0.217 0.110 0.238 0.512 0.349 0.218 0.000 0.164
Castilla y León 0.361 0.222 0.000 0.132 0.511 0.582 0.402 0.314
Castilla La Mancha 0.761 0.724 0.458 0.566 0.095 0.432 0.822 0.356
Cataluña 0.558 0.821 0.396 0.552 0.595 0.576 0.932 0.237
Valencia 0.490 0.639 0.636 0.731 0.078 0.111 1.261 0.602
Extremadura 1.000 0.486 0.149 0.245 0.002 0.590 0.595 0.130
Galicia 0.293 0.030 0.210 0.000 0.483 0.000 0.724 0.294
Madrid 0.602 1.000 1.000 0.825 0.343 0.510 1.000 0.538
Murcia 0.755 0.852 0.937 1.000 0.000 0.493 0.684 0.000
Navarra 0.352 0.723 0.606 0.480 1.000 0.613 0.465 0.109
País Vasco 0.270 0.439 0.364 0.238 0.938 1.000 0.720 0.197
La Rioja 0.615 0.248 0.394 0.665 0.751 0.279 0.277 0.265
1980-91 1994-2007 2010
RECOVERY
2014-15
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Figure 3.2: Scatter graphics of Martin‘s GDP and employment indexes 
 
The composite index of resilience will be obtained via DEA, which has certain 
advantages for measuring resilience. Firstly, it has potential for dealing with a variety of 
values and data, which is of considerable value given the multifaceted nature of 
resilience. Secondly, it provides a method of data standardisation, whereby ―decisional 
units‖ are ranked from zero to one, according, in this case, to their level of resilience. 
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DEA can be used to rank regions in terms of their resilience by computing a composite 
index. This approach provides a scheme of weights for variables defining regional 
resilience, thus avoiding the use of arbitrary weightings or aggregation based on the 
personal views of experts. The literature has previously explored the usefulness of DEA 
for building composite indexes in similar contexts (Reig, 2010; Sánchez et al., 2014).  
DEA is a mathematical programming technique designed by Charnes et al. (1978) to 
calculate different measures of efficiency in production units, or decision-making units 
(DMU) in general. The basic theoretical framework underlying DEA is a production 
function, in which it is assumed that a set of 1,...,k K DMU make use of a vector of 
inputs 1( ,... )Mx x x  to produce a vector of outputs 1,...,( )Ry y y . In a basic DEA model, 
the efficiency of DMU0 is defined by the maximum of a ratio that transforms inputs to 
outputs (Reig et al., 2011): 
0 0
0 0
1
0 0
1
r m
R
r r
r
u v M
m m
m
u y
Max
v x




 
subject to:          (3.3) 
0
1
0
1
1
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m mk
m
u y
v x





            1,...,k k  
0 0ru      1,...,r R  
0 0mv     1,...,m M  
 
 
The weights 0ru  and 0mv represent the non-negative weightings applied to output 0ry  
and input 0mx , which are chosen in order to place DMU0 in the most favourable light, 
such that they are computed by maximizing its efficiency ratio. Thus, a specific 
weighting is used for each DMU under evaluation, subject to the constraint that the 
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efficiency ratios computed with these weightings have an upper bound of one. Thus, for 
the dominance of one DMU0 over any other DMUk  positive weightings 0ru  and 0mv  are 
required such that 
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
R M R M
r r m m r rk m mk
r m r m
u y v x u y v x
   
         for all other DMUk       (3.4) 
 
After transformation to a linear form, expression (3.3) can also be used to assess the 
relative resilience performance of a decision-making unit. It can be simplified by 
assuming a single input (equal to unity) for each unit. A single input produces different 
intensities of several factors that are relevant to resilience assessment. Thus for each 
DMU0 the following model can be computed. 
0 0 0 0
1
r
R
r r
r
Max h I 

  
subject to:                                               (3.5) 
0
1
1
R
r rk
r
I

     1,...,k K  
0 0r               1,...,r R  
where 0h  is the technical efficiency (here, resilience) score for DMU0; 0r  is the 
weighting attached to indicator r in the resilience assessment of  DMU0;  rkI  represents 
the value of indicator r for DMUk. The objective function involves finding the 
maximum value of a composite index derived from a set of indicators associated with 
different stages of resilience change processes. 
 
Table 3.4 gives the resilience indexes of 17 Spanish regions for the various crisis and 
recovery periods considered. The most resilient regions in the first crisis are seen to be 
Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla y León and Galicia. In the crisis of 2008-09, Galicia is 
again the most resilient region along with Madrid; and in the last crisis, the regions that 
emerge as the most resistant are Baleares, Canarias and Madrid. In the recovery stages, 
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Baleares, Extremadura and Madrid are the most resilient between 1980 and 1991, and 
Navarra and País Vasco in 2010. In the last stage, 2014-15, the islands and Valencia 
lead the resilience ranking. The islands and Madrid therefore emerge as the most 
resilient regions for the majority of the sample periods. 
 
                                    Table 3.4: Resilience index (1980-2015) 
 
 
 3.3.2 Multiple Factor Analysis  
The MFA method has been used to study the evolution of latent economic variables, 
such as welfare, development or, as in this case, resilience. This method enables the 
analysis of groups of different indicators measured at different points in time. It is 
possible, therefore, to include qualitative changes in the latent variable by selecting the 
most suitable indicators for each point in time. This multivariate exploratory method 
permits us to study the resilience of the Spanish regions from an essentially graphic 
perspective. The decision to study numerical data using graphic representations is 
supported by the psychology of human information processing, which could be 
1992-93 2008-09 2011-13 1980-91 1994-2007 2010 2014-15
Andalucía 0.328 0.856 0.510 0.977 0.779 0.442 0.906
Aragón 0.717 0.753 0.652 0.623 0.352 0.832 0.639
Asturias 0.536 0.520 0.115 0.000 0.078 0.446 0.515
Baleares 0.887 0.731 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.583 1.000
Canarias 1.000 0.559 0.952 0.743 0.855 0.428 1.000
Cantabria 1.000 0.860 0.255 0.218 0.512 0.350 0.164
Castilla y León 1.000 0.953 0.303 0.375 0.132 0.582 0.415
Castilla La Mancha 0.615 0.884 0.463 0.868 0.566 0.432 0.652
Cataluña 0.520 0.514 0.744 0.846 0.552 0.626 0.739
Valencia 0.550 0.000 0.545 0.679 0.731 0.111 1.000
Extremadura 0.581 0.987 0.635 1.000 0.245 0.590 0.472
Galicia 1.000 1.000 0.635 0.293 0.210 0.483 0.574
Madrid 0.660 1.000 0.946 1.000 1.000 0.510 0.841
Murcia 0.917 0.845 0.732 0.945 1.000 0.493 0.542
Navarra 0.641 0.944 0.578 0.723 0.606 1.000 0.369
País Vasco 0.810 0.662 0.637 0.441 0.364 1.000 0.571
La Rioja 0.880 0.812 0.298 0.615 0.665 0.751 0.324
Crisis Recovery
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summarised as follows: perception in graphics optimises the capacity of our 
information processing system, (Batista and Martínez, 1989). This method enables us to 
synthesise and analyse the large amount of information we need to handle. 
The MFA, developed by Escofier and Pagés (1992, 1994), is a factorial method 
adapted to the treatment of data tables in which the same set of individuals is described 
through several groups of variables. The groups can be combinations of several 
quantitative or qualitative variables, tables of variables derived from other three-
dimensional tables, or the same set of variables measured over different time periods. 
The organisation of original data into groups of variables enriches their study, because 
the pursued goals are not restricted to obtaining a typology of individuals defined by a 
set of variables; they extend to the search for possible relationships between the 
structures obtained within each group. The variables of a group measured on a set of 
individuals form a two-dimensional table.  
This study works with 3 tables, one for each resilience index considered  (our own, 
Martin‘s GDP index and Martin‘s employment index) and each table contains 17 rows, 
one for each region, and 7 columns, one for each period of analysis (3 crisis periods and 
4 recovery periods). We construct the global table by juxtaposing these 3 (Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3: Tables used in the analysis 
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The aim of the analysis is to reveal the main factors of maximum variability 
described, in a balanced manner, by the various groups of variables. The MFA 
technique is based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and comprises two phases. 
In the first, each group of variables or table is analysed separately by PCA. The second 
phase involves the analysis of the global table, where each table has been weighted by 
the inverse of the first eigenvalue of its individual PCA from the first phase. This 
weighting scheme balances the loadings of the various groups on the first factor 
extracted. Being a complete factorial analysis, the MFA shows the classic results of 
PCA. In the analysis of categorical tables, MFA shows the results of Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA).  
The objective of MFA is to check for the presence of structures that are common to 
groups of variables (tables). It also provides an overall picture of the relationships 
between groups, based on Escofier‘s RV coefficient  (Escofier and Pagés, 1992; 1994), 
which is obtained from the coefficients of linear correlation between any two variables. 
Its value is between 0 (for no relationship between variables of the two groups 
considered) and 1 (clouds representing the groups are homothetic). The RV coefficients 
enable quantification of the global similarity between groups of indicators.  
For the factor scores of the individuals (or cases); MFA provides two different 
results; namely, partial and global points (individuals).  
By partial point, we mean the factor score of an individual based on the values of 
only one group of variables. Thus, in this study there will be 3 partial individuals for 
each Spanish region, G1, which reflects only the values of our own resilience indicator; 
G2, which reflects the values of Martin‘s GDP indicator; and G3, which reflects the 
values of Martin‘s employment indicator. 
Individuals whose partial points are close to one another are exhibiting low internal 
variability and reflecting the previously-detected common structure between tables. 
Individuals whose partial points are more distant from each other, meanwhile, are 
exhibiting high internal variability and therefore constitute exceptions to the common 
structure. In our case, regions whose partial points are close will perform similarly on 
all three indexes. Those with more distant partial points, on the other hand, will perform 
differently on at least one of the three resilience indexes.  
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The global or mean points of each region refer to the factor score of an individual 
considering every value of every variable in every group. A global point is the 
barycenter or mean of its respective partial points, and therefore offers a more synthetic 
picture of an individual. In our study, the global points reflect the resilience of the 
regions according to all three indexes jointly. 
The possibility of plotting partial and global points simultaneously on the same 
factorial plane provides a powerful visual instrument for the comparison of regional 
resilience from multiple points of view. A full description of this method is given in 
Lebart et al. (1995) and Escofier and Pagés (1992). Several applications of MFA to 
trend data can be found in García Lautre and Abascal (2003); García Lautre (2001), 
Abascal, García Lautre and Landaluce (2004). 
MFA offers the possibility of including illustrative or supplementary elements 
(individuals or variables) as in any exploratory factor analysis. The supplementary 
variables are included in new groups or tables. These elements do not play an active role 
in the factor structure but can be projected onto the factorial planes, thereby enriching 
their interpretation. Supplementary variables contain information that is relevant but 
cannot be considered to directly affect the issue at hand. Examples of this type of 
variable in the case that concerns are regional endowments of public or human capital in 
each period. 
The supplementary variables that will characterise the Spanish regions are those 
detailed below. A review of relevant literature was undertaken to aid identification of 
such variables. They can be classified into 2 groups: value of capital and production 
structure. 
In the following table (Table 3.5) we can see the descriptive statistics of employed 
variables. 
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Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics  
 
Value of capital 
To analyze the effects of capital on resilience, we focus on three types of capital: public, 
human and social. 
Public capital is given by the variable public capital per capita in thousands of Euros 
at constant 2008 prices. The data were supplied by the Fundación BBVA and Ivie 
(Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas). The role of the public sector 
investor is crucial in the economic growth of all countries. A country‘s level of 
infrastructure (in transport, water supply and sanitation, urban, health, education, etc.) 
depends on public sector investment activity, which, if misdirected or insufficient, can 
constrain both private enterprise and public services. The share of public capital stock 
employed in private production makes these infrastructures a key factor in the economic 
growth of every country or region. Public investment also plays an important role in the 
economic cycle, especially in the economic policy debate arising from the current 
recession, because it can be used as a stabilisation mechanism to offset declining private 
investment. The importance of long-term results is discussed, as are the short term 
effects, which can also be counterproductive, by driving out private investment (the 
crowding out effect). Thus, it is of great interest to study the evolution of public 
Units N Minimum Maximum Mean Stand. Deviation Source
GDP Thousands of € 629 3,554,855.00 200,807,804.00 45,973,769.82 45,893,738.18 BD. Mores and INE
Employment Thousands of people 629 78.20 3,581.35 872.79 796.33 BD. Mores and INE
Value of capital
Social capital per capita Index 510 37.48 1,989.18 375.69 362.83 Fundación BBVA e Ivie
Public capital per capita Thousands of € 510 2.88 19.00 9.29 3.84 Fundación BBVA e Ivie
Illiterates and uneducated % 527 19.09 80.16 47.60 14.89 INE
High school graduates % 527 15.13 49.64 331.63 7.14 INE
Vocational training graduates % 527 0.58 24.74 9.51 5.13 INE
University graduates % 527 3.72 28.91 11.25 4.66 INE
Value of human capital % 527 2.13 3.20 2.58 0.22 INE
Productive structure
Agriculture % 561 0.12 15.24 5.43 3.70 INE
Industry % 561 5.31 34.82 20.22 7.31 INE
Construction % 561 4.37 14.56 8.44 1.87 INE
Market services % 561 36.84 73.27 50.27 8.31 INE
Non-market services % 561 7.76 28.08 15.69 3.40 INE
Productive specialization % 561 0.24 0.56 0.34 0.07 INE
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investment and how it has affected economic growth. Our analysis therefore includes a 
public capital variable to study its possible influence on regional resilience (Gil et al., 
2003; Ezcurra et al., 2005). 
Several different variables are taken in relation to human capital. Specifically, 
employed population by level of education and region (expressed in %): and shares of 
illiterates and uneducated, high school graduates, vocational training graduates and 
university graduates. These data are taken from the Labour Force Survey of INE. 
Another variable taken to determine the value of human capital is the value of per capita 
human capital measured in terms of the number of workers without human capital that 
would be required to attain an equivalent level of productivity. At the same time, the 
aggregate human capital of a region will be the number of workers without human 
capital required to attain the productivity capacity of the population. The data were 
accessed from the Fundación Bancaja e Ivie (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones 
Económicas)
13
.  
Some authors (Glaeser and Saiz, 2004) claim that qualifications can increase 
resilience and economic growth, because "workers with college degrees and higher 
educational qualifications are more flexible and agile in an economic downturn" 
(Christopher et al., 2010). The overall view (Chapple and Lester, 2010; Sheffi, 2005, 
among others) is that highly skilled workers strengthen regional resilience. The quality 
of human capital also affects regional growth (Crescenzi et al., 2015). Wide regional 
gaps in human capital endowment also have repercussions in terms of infrastructure, 
services, and thereby income inequalities (Lagravinese, 2014).  
The value of social capital is given by the variable social capital per capita. These 
data were accessed from the Fundación BBVA and Ivie (Instituto Valenciano de 
Investigaciones Económicas). Many papers consider social capital as an intangible asset 
which facilitates the achievement of personal and group results, both economic and 
social, by generating positive externalities or potential benefits for members of a 
                                                     
13
 Capital Humano en España y su distribución provincial. Enero de 2013. Database available at: 
http://www.ivie.es/es/banco/caphum/series.php 
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particular social group
14
. These benefits derive from mutual trust, and shared rules and 
beliefs concerning the expectations and behaviour of group members. Paxton (1999) 
highlights that a relevant characteristic of social capital – which makes it something 
more than trust, rules and shared values – is that its positive effects are generated from a 
social network. Thus, the scope of the network that makes up the group and benefits 
from these effects on its members is a key aspect of social capital. It should be noted 
that the size of the network can vary greatly, sometimes being limited to the closest 
circle but potentially reaching the whole of society and including all its members. To 
calculate social capital one needs to model the investment it involves and make 
assumptions concerning what moves individuals when determining their optimal 
investment (Glaeser et al., 2002), including their estimations of the expected future 
profitability and costs associated with their investment. Social capital data have been 
used in various analyses (Pastor and Tortosa 2008; Peiró and Tortosa 2015; Salas and 
Sanchez 2012; Barrutia and Echebarria 2010; Boix and Galletto 2009; Gleave, Petrey 
and Carroll 2012; Manca 2011, 2012; Miguélez, Moreno and Artís 2008, among others) 
of the relationship between social capital and economic performance, many studies 
having confirmed its importance. 
 
Production structure 
Regional production structure is a key factor in explaining a region‘s capacity to recover 
from a crisis, that is, regional resilience (Crescenzi et al., 2015). A region‘s resilience 
may be explained by industrial sector performance and specific industrial activities 
during and after a recessionary event. The role of the manufacturing sector in explaining 
regional economic growth and convergence across areas depends on its ability to sustain 
higher investments, and its capacity for capital accumulation and the production of 
tradable goods (Porter, 2003; Rodrik, 2013). The business cycle literature has long 
studied the close relationship between shocks affecting industrial employment and 
aggregate employment fluctuations and the role of industry in national and regional 
                                                     
14
 Molina et al. (2008, 17-22) provides a review of the concept of social capital. 
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economic growth during booms and busts (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 1993). 
Furthermore, certain economic sectors are known to be more subject to cyclical 
economic fluctuations than others and as such suffer the most from economic 
downturns (Conroy, 1975; Siegel et al., 1995; Ormerod, 2010). The manufacturing and 
construction industries typically appear to suffer more during an economic crisis than 
does the services sector, which is more flexible and able to absorb and renew itself more 
rapidly. The presence of a significant number of public employees, moreover, enhances 
resilience to economic shocks, and can almost fully absorb the effects of a recession. 
The geographical distribution of these activities across regions might therefore be 
expected to play a role in explaining spatial differences in resistance to recessionary 
shocks (Martin, 2012). 
Thus, besides including the production structure of each region, we also include a 
variable for productive specialisation, SI, which is calculated from a specialisation index 
based on the Herfindahl concentration index:  
2
1
N
i
i
SI s

  
where is  is the share of the 
thi  activity  in total activities. The index is the sum of the 
squared shares of each of the n economic activities in total economic activities. We 
calculate the productive specialisation index from the share of each activity (GDP of 
each activity) in total productive activity (total GDP of the economy).  The thi activities 
included in the index are agriculture, construction, industry, market services and non-
market services. The index has a theoretical range of close to zero to 1, with higher 
values indicating higher specialisation. Regional specialisation in a specific sector can 
often be an advantage during periods of economic growth, but can also become a 
disadvantage in a time of crisis.  
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3.3.2.1 MFA of resilience in the Spanish regions
15
  
 
The complete data for the 17 Spanish regions comprises 3 different resilience indicators 
measured over seven consecutive periods (Figure 3.3) and 13 supplementary variables. 
This section examines all this information simultaneously by MFA to explore three 
issues: firstly, a comparison of the three resilience indicators; secondly, the structure of 
relationships between the resilience indicators, including the time effect (seven periods) 
and the supplementary variables; and, finally, a characterisation of the regions in terms 
of their resilience and of the socioeconomic features represented by the supplementary 
variables. 
The MFA of the three resilience tables (Figure 3.3) provided the first two factors 
which, together, account for over 50% (the first 36.99% and the second 17.10%) of the 
total variance in the table. This is considered sufficient to enable us to project the 
variables (the supplementary ones included) and individuals onto planes formed by 
factor 1 (horizontal axis) and factor 2 (vertical axis) as shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6. 
These graphs make it possible to analyse the three issues mentioned above. It may be 
worth briefly recalling some basics of how to interpret them. In such graphs, the 
factorial coordinate of each variable is connected to the origin of coordinates by an 
arrow. Two points that are close together on the graph mean that the arrows are 
separated by an angle close to zero degrees, so the two variables are sure to be 
positively correlated. If the angle is close to 180 degrees, then the correlation is negative 
and if it is close to 90 degrees, the correlation is close to zero. In addition, the value of 
the coordinate of one point is the linear correlation of the variable with the 
corresponding factor. Variables that are close to a factor have strong (positive or 
negative) correlation with that factor and very weak correlation with the other factor. 
Comparative analysis of the three resilience measurement methods is conducted 
using the RV coefficients (Table 3.6) and the variables graph (Figure 3.4). The RV 
values indicate the existence of a common structure between the 3 tables, which is 
stronger between our resilience index and the remaining two. 
                                                     
15
 The appendix gives the MFA for other crisis and recovery periods according to Sánchez (2012). 
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Table 3.6: RV relation coefficients between indexes       
 
The detected common structure is supported by the fact that the resilience indicators 
point roughly in the same direction for each period. Thus, the three resilience indicators 
for recovery periods 1, 2, 4 and crisis period 3 point to the left in the variable graph 
(Figure 3.4) and the indicators for crisis periods 1 and 2 and recovery period 3 point to 
the top right of the graph. It should be noted that the GDP resilience indicators in crisis 
periods 1 and 2 are quite far from the two remaining indicators (composite and 
employment). Moreover, the three indicators for recovery period 3 are also separate 
from each other. This shows that the common structure between the 3 tables is less 
obvious; suggesting that, in these periods, the three methods will yield clearly distinct 
resilience scores for the Spanish regions.  
The second issue, the analysis of the structure of relationships between the resilience 
indicators and the supplementary variables, is addressed by again giving meaning to the 
two factors by using the variables graph (Figure 3.4). The supplementary variables 
relating to the socioeconomic characteristics of the regions are projected onto the 
variables graph (Figure 3.4, variables in black). These variables are the means for the 
time period considered (1980-2015). Means were used because a detailed analysis of 
their evolution has confirmed their stability and high correlation over time. This enables 
a simpler analysis with no need to enter each of the 13 variables for each of the 7 
periods considered. 
According to the factorial plane (Figure 3.4), factor 1 (horizontal axis) mainly 
reflects resilience in recovery periods 1, 2 and 4 and crisis period 3, since these 
indicators point to the left, showing their strong negative correlation with this factor. 
The supplementary variables public capital, share of industry in the economy and, less 
clearly, vocational training and human capital, point to the right on the plane, showing 
Our resilience index Martin's GDP index Martin's employment index
Our resilience index 1.000
Martin's GDP index 0.718 1.000
Martin's employment index 0.803 0.458 1.000
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these variables to be positively correlated with factor 1. High school graduates, market 
services and productive specialisation, on the other hand, point to the left, and are 
therefore negatively correlated with it. Finally, social capital points slightly to the left, 
showing a certain negative correlation with factor 1. 
In consequence, regions with negative factor scores on factor 1 are more resilient 
than the mean in recovery periods 1, 2, 4 and in crisis period 3. The graphs show these 
regions to be characterised as above average in terms of share of high school graduates 
and market services and below-average in terms of public capital and share of industry 
in the economy. They also appear, albeit more modestly, to be above average in terms 
of social capital. The opposite applies to those regions with positive scores on factor 1.  
We could therefore say that the most resilient regions in the recovery periods (1, 2 and 
4) are those that stand out for their specialisation in market services and for their share 
of population with a high school education. In contrast, the industry share in their 
economies is barely significant. 
Factor 2 (vertical axis) mainly reflects the resilience in crisis periods 1 and 2 and 
recovery period 3, since these indicators clearly point upwards, and are therefore 
strongly positively correlated with it. The supplementary variables are not closely 
correlated with factor 2, since none of them points clearly upwards or downwards on the 
plane (Figure 3.4). Only university graduates, human capital and vocational training 
graduates show a slight positive correlation with factor 2, while construction and 
percentage of uneducated are slightly negatively correlated with it.  
Thus, regions with positive factor scores on factor 2 are more resilient than the mean 
in crisis periods 1 and 2 and recovery period 3. The graphs depict these regions as being 
above the mean in higher studies, human capital and vocational training and below the 
mean in construction and without studies. The opposite can be said for those regions 
with positive scores on factor 2. 
Those regions with high scores on both factors can be said to be characterised by 
opposing correlations between their component variables. For instance, regions that 
have positive scores on both factors (lying in quadrant IV) are above the mean for 
resilience in crisis periods 1,2 and recovery period 3 and below the mean in recovery 
period 4 and vice versa. It is remarkable that this opposition reflects a resilience trend 
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already pointed out in section 3.3.2. The characterisation of the regions lying towards 
the centre of the quadrants, far from the origin of coordinates is very enriching, as 
explained in the following lines. 
All the interpretations of the variables graph (Figure 3.4) are supported by the 
correlation matrix of resilience indicators and supplementary variables (Table A3.4). 
Indeed, although some correlation coefficients are not very high, they confirm what was 
said above. 
Now that the factors have a meaning, we are ready to address the final issue, the 
characterisation of the regions in terms of their resilience and the socioeconomic 
features represented by the supplementary variables. 
 To do this, each Spanish region is projected on the factorial plane 1-2 taking all the 
information relating to its resilience, that is, the global points of MFA are obtained 
(Figure 3.5). For the sake of brevity, the positions of only a few regions are commented 
on. 
According to the interpretation of Figure 3.5, the regions in quadrant IV on the plane 
appear to be above average in terms of resilience in crisis periods 1 and 2 and recovery 
period 3 and below average in recovery period 4. A look at Tables 3.2 and 3.3, which 
give the indicators of resilience, shows that Castilla y León, Galicia and Cantabria are 
more resilient in crisis periods 1 and 2. Navarra and País Vasco, which are also in 
quadrant IV, are the most resilient in recovery period 3 (2010). These results coincide 
with those of Cuadrado-Roura and Maroto (2016) who observed that the regions on the 
River Ebro (País Vasco, La Rioja and Navarra, Aragón) experienced above-average 
growth after 2007, and all these regions are situated in the same quadrant (IV). A look at 
Table 3.4 shows that these regions are, in general, very poorly positioned in period 4, 
thus fulfilling the opposition effect mentioned above. Quadrant II contains Valencia, a 
region whose characteristics are completely opposite to those of the regions just 
mentioned. As expected, Valencia is the most resilient region in period 4 and is poorly 
positioned in crisis periods 1 and 2 and in recovery period 3.  
Quadrant III, which represents recovery periods 1, 2 and 4, and crisis 3, can be seen 
to contain the regions of Baleares and Canarias, Madrid and Murcia, which are the best 
performers in terms of resilience in these periods. The most resilient regions in recovery 
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periods 1 and 2, Baleares, Madrid and Murcia, stand out for having above-average 
industry specialisation and, in particular, economies concentrated mainly on market 
services (chiefly tourism), as can be seen in Figure 3.4. They also stand out for having 
an above-average percentage of high school graduates. According to Maroto (2012), the 
effects of a crisis can differ substantially across industries. The manufacturing, mining, 
energy and construction sectors, for instance, tend to be much more badly affected by 
business cycles than is the case for services sectors. This is reflected in the 
performances of Baleares and Madrid, whose specialisation is the services sector. The 
same quadrant (III) contains the regions that show most resilience in crisis 3, namely, 
Baleares, Madrid and Canarias. 
And finally, in quadrant I, we find Asturias, which is below the mean for resilience 
in all periods, especially crisis period 3. The supplementary variables on which Asturias 
scores above the mean are construction, percentage of uneducated and industry. 
So, as can be seen from the results, different productive and regional specialisation 
patterns produce different levels of resilience in the Spanish regions. The conclusion 
drawn by most studies is that the analysis of industry structures, regional specialisation 
and gaps with the national average can explain regional economic growth and, of 
course, possible regional convergence or divergence within a country in terms of 
productivity and per capita income. Thus, regions with a relatively high share of 
industries with above-average sensitivity to the business cycle can, ceteris paribus, be 
expected to be significantly affected by a recession (De Groot et al., 2011). 
Bristow (2010) suggested that the most resilient regions were already specialised in 
more dynamic, less sensitive sectors. These resilient regions have, moreover, steadily 
maintained their specialisation patterns, and reinforced their competitive advantages 
during and after the crisis. 
The various crisis periods in Spain and the policies used to address them have had a 
clear impact at the regional level. One of the most remarkable effects has been the 
increase in regional economic disparities (Cuadrado and Maroto, 2016). In 
consequence, there is a small group of regions that can be considered economically 
resilient, as they have responded better and more flexibly to the general negative 
framework, versus another group of regions that have been heavily hit by the crisis and 
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have shown no clear capacity to react. 
 
  
 
 
115 
 
Figure 3.4: Variables projected on the factorial plane (1-2) 
 
Our index
Martin ‘s GDP 
index
Martin’s employment
index Period
Recovery1 RGDP1 Remploy1 1980-91
Crisis1 CGDP1 Cemploy1 1992-93
Recovery2 RGDP2 Remploy2 1994-2007
Crisis2 CGDP2 Cemploy2 2008-09
Recovery3 RGDP3 Remploy3 2010
Crisis3 CGDP3 Cemploy3 2011-13
Recovery4 RGDP4 Remploy4 2014-15
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Figure 3.5: Global points on the factorial plane (1-2) 
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 MFA also provides the partial points of each region represented in Figure 3.6. This 
graph enables us to return to the first issue, the common structure between the three 
indicators of resilience. As explained at the beginning of the section, the three tables 
share a common structure that is least obvious between groups 2 (GDP indicators) and 3 
(employment indicators). The variability of the partial points, which is known as 
―within variability‖, is measured with respect to that of their respective global points. 
Thus, regions with low within-variability are stable in terms of their ranking across the 
three resilience indicators considered, whereas as that of regions with high within-
variability, will vary greatly, according to which indicator is used. 
The only partial indicators represented are those of the regions with the highest 
within-variability on axis 1 (Galicia) and axis 2 (Canarias); and those with the lowest 
within-variability among the partial individuals, País Vasco (least inertia on axis 1) and 
Madrid (least inertia on axis 2). The analysis of these regions is enough not only to 
reveal some specific differences between the three resilience indicators considered but 
also to confirm the overall stability between the three methods. Thus, Galicia and 
Canarias occupy very distinct positions on the plane (Figure 3.5) and therefore differ 
greatly in terms of resilience. Thus, Galicia is clearly below the mean in recovery 
periods 1, 2, 4 and crisis period 3 when employment indicators are used, whereas, it 
appears close to the mean in these periods when GDP indicators are used. Being a 
hybrid between the employment and GDP resilience indicators, our indicator (group 1) 
places Galicia close to the global point. The analysis for Canarias is similar but in 
relation to factor 2. Madrid and País Vasco have different partial points but the 
closeness of their positions on the plane suggests that their results are not affected by 
the type of resilience indicator used. 
Table 3.7 shows the regions with the highest and lowest within-variability on factors 
1 and 2. The highest variability is that of Galicia and Extremadura on axis 1 and 
Canarias and Asturias on axis 2. At the other extreme, the lowest variability is that of 
País Vasco and La Rioja on axis 1, and Madrid and Extremadura on axis 2. In general, 
researchers try to explain regional resilience based on Martin‘s employment indicator 
(2012). Our analysis suggests, however, their conclusions might vary significantly if, 
instead of using employment, they were to use GDP, as shown in Figure 3.6.Thus, given 
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that our indicator can be seen as a hybrid of these two indicators, we suggest that the 
joint use of both indicators can help to smooth the results. 
 
Table 3.7: Within-variability partial points 
 
  
Cases with the highest within- variability Cases with the lowest within- variability
axis 1 Variability axis 2 Variability axis 1 Variability axis 2 Variability
Galicia 24.380 Canarias 23.635 País Vasco 0.010 Madrid 0.338
Extremadura 21.922 Asturias 15.720 La Rioja 0.604 Extremadura 0.389
Canarias 7.864 Aragón 14.271 Navarra 1.251 La Rioja 1.028
Baleares 6.810 Valencia 12.074 Cataluña 1.532 Castilla y León 1.247
Asturias 6.703 Murcia 7.668 Castilla La Mancha 1.961 Andalucía 1.608
Madrid 6.076 Baleares 4.903 Cantabria 2.237 Galicia 1.691
Castilla y León 5.740 Cataluña 4.573 Aragón 2.441 Castilla La Mancha 2.076
Murcia 4.157 Navarra 3.125 Valencia 2.558 País Vasco 2.571
Andalucía 3.753 Cantabria 3.085 Andalucía 3.753 Cantabria 3.085
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Figure 3.6: Global and partial points on the factorial plane (1-2) 
 
 
 
120 
 
3.4 Summary and conclusions  
 
There has been increasing interest in and invocation of the notion of resilience in the 
social and environmental sciences over the past few years, and the concept has even 
entered national, regional and local policy discourse. According to Hanley (1998), 
however, the concept, while highly suggestive, suffers from imprecise definition and 
weak conceptualisation, which in turn weakens its marketability as an analytical or 
explanatory tool.  Our aim here has been to try to identify which characteristics of a 
region most influence its resilience. We begin by constructing a composite index of 
resilience for the 17 regions of Spain for the period 1980 to 2015, using the DEA 
approach. In a second stage, we apply MFA in order to analyse the factors that make 
regions more or less resilient and compare our index of resilience to that of Martin 
(2012). MFA is a multivariate exploratory method that enables us to study the resilience 
of the Spanish regions from an essentially graphic perspective. By plotting the resilience 
index scores and the socioeconomic variables on the same graph, we are able to 
establish an interesting relationship between the two and derive an interpretation of the 
influence of socioeconomics on regional resilience. 
Our results show that the resilience of Spanish regions varies according to their socio 
economic characteristics. In the first two crisis periods, 1992-92 and 2008-09, and in 
2010 (year of recovery) the most resilient regions are Castilla y León, Cantabria, 
Galicia, La Rioja, País Vasco and Navarra. These are industry-oriented regions with 
higher-quality public and human capital and show the highest percentages of vocational 
training graduates. Baleares, Canarias, Madrid and Murcia show resilience especially in 
recovery periods, 1, 2 and 4. They stand out as having above-average productive 
specialisation, and in particular, as economies mainly focused on market services. They 
also have a population with an above-average share of high-school graduates. 
Another finding from this study is that the results differ greatly according to whether 
we take into account our own index of resilience or that of Martin (2012). A different 
choice of indicator would cause some regions, such as Galicia or Canarias, to vary their 
position on the plane and consequently their characterisation in terms of resilience. In 
 
 
121 
 
this respect, observation shows that the partial 1, which represents our indicator of 
resilience, is the closest in all cases to the mid-point. This would justify the use of both 
GDP and employment for the characterisation of resilience.  
The increasing use of the concept of resilience in regional studies calls for further 
work on the issue of what determines the resilience of an economy (regional or local), 
and what causes it to increase or decline. This article focuses mainly on productive 
specialisation, productive structure and public, human and social capital. Naturally, 
these elements or factors only partially explain the resilience capacity of regional 
economies. Other aspects requiring exploration include the institutional framework, the 
entrepreneurship capacity and the export dynamics of each region. Some of these 
potential factors relate to those analysed here, but there is clearly much scope for further 
analysis. 
Although of an exploratory nature, the arguments and analysis contained in this 
article suggest that further, more detailed, research would be worthwhile. One 
possibility would be a more rigorous statistical analysis of the reaction and recovery 
dynamics of regional economies to recessionary shocks, using advanced time series 
techniques.  
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Appendix 
Table A3.1: Growth rates in recession periods 
 
 
Table A3.2: Growth rates in recovery periods 
GDP growth rate Employment growth rate GDP growth rate Employment growth rate GDP growth rate Employment growth rate
Andalucía -2.475 -5.825 -3.351 -7.229 -5.055 -8.093
Aragón -0.580 -3.500 -3.563 -6.641 -4.320 -6.382
Asturias -4.532 -3.978 -4.847 -6.597 -7.677 -7.988
Baleares -0.270 -2.892 -3.913 -5.686 -2.531 2.317
Canarias 1.732 -3.842 -3.962 -7.736 -2.780 -5.074
Cantabria -2.670 -2.380 -3.786 -4.929 -6.363 -7.379
Castilla y León 1.003 -2.585 -3.153 -5.078 -6.116 -7.883
Castilla La Mancha -2.766 -3.727 -3.295 -6.405 -5.292 -9.330
Cataluña -1.275 -4.913 -4.055 -8.127 -3.848 -7.398
Valencia -1.132 -4.652 -5.111 -9.612 -4.871 -6.293
Extremadura -1.365 -3.939 -3.082 -5.178 -4.410 -9.110
Galicia -0.434 -2.456 -4.007 -3.813 -4.407 -7.617
Madrid -0.554 -4.239 -3.056 -4.566 -2.808 -5.975
Murcia -2.184 -2.685 -3.374 -8.611 -3.913 -5.393
Navarra -1.611 -3.693 -4.391 -4.139 -4.701 -7.490
País Vasco -0.515 -3.159 -5.070 -5.771 -4.397 -8.648
La Rioja -1.185 -2.851 -4.438 -4.904 -6.145 -7.140
TOTAL -1.112 -4.140 -3.834 -6.675 -4.261 -6.967
CRISIS
1992-1993 2008-2009 2011-2013
GDP growth rate Employment growth rate GDP growth rate Employment growth rate GDP growth rate Employment growth rate GDP growth rate Employment growth rate
Andalucía 45.763 15.787 60.502 85.300 -1.181 -1.986 3.153 5.063
Aragón 31.655 7.673 53.000 53.217 1.007 -3.638 2.736 4.197
Asturias 11.475 -8.208 42.739 32.587 -0.018 -3.320 3.090 -0.040
Baleares 46.938 16.210 45.843 101.572 -0.696 -1.213 3.238 5.540
Canarias 27.061 12.660 63.225 90.978 -0.113 -2.339 2.815 6.673
Cantabria 20.369 -5.109 50.333 65.266 -0.276 -3.214 2.551 1.053
Castilla y León 26.305 -1.972 42.670 36.652 0.157 -1.217 2.884 2.063
Castilla La Mancha 42.706 12.137 57.423 69.256 -0.951 -2.041 3.233 2.345
Cataluña 34.394 14.862 55.420 68.274 0.378 -1.252 3.323 1.546
Valencia 31.588 9.727 63.151 81.689 -0.995 -3.798 3.597 4.001
Extremadura 52.540 5.448 47.458 45.151 -1.197 -1.176 3.044 0.827
Galicia 23.511 -7.365 49.446 26.758 0.081 -4.405 3.151 1.926
Madrid 36.179 19.880 74.867 88.768 -0.290 -1.613 3.380 3.565
Murcia 42.497 15.717 72.852 101.908 -1.202 -1.704 3.118 -0.047
Navarra 25.946 12.096 62.195 62.805 1.455 -1.051 2.936 0.686
País Vasco 22.564 4.123 54.397 44.619 1.291 1.072 3.148 1.280
La Rioja 36.737 -1.229 55.356 76.709 0.794 -2.879 2.781 1.735
TOTAL 33.521 9.509 58.919 68.648 -0.204 -2.005 3.215 3.017
2014-2015
RECOVERY
1980-1991 1994-2007 2010
 
 
129 
 
Table A3.3: Correlation matrix
 
efficiency NIDH agriculture industry construction mark.serv non-mark si public cap uneducated
high 
school
voc. Train university human cap. social cap. recovery1 RGDP1 Remploy1 recovery2 RGDP2 Remploy2 recovery3 RGDP3 Remploy3 recovery4 RGDP4 Remploy4 crisis1 CGDP1 Cemploy1 crisis2 CGDP2 Cemploy2 crisis3 CGDP3 Cemploy3
efficiency 1.000
NIDH 0.786 1.000
agriculture -0.716 -0.678 1.000
industry 0.114 0.525 -0.050 1.000
construction -0.797 -0.868 0.538 -0.512 1.000
mark.serv 0.594 0.244 -0.701 -0.609 -0.214 1.000
non-mark -0.693 -0.750 0.600 -0.481 0.748 -0.319 1.000
si 0.670 0.364 -0.756 -0.516 -0.283 0.982 -0.402 1.000
public cap -0.372 0.089 0.397 0.452 0.045 -0.674 0.245 -0.627 1.000
uneducated -0.796 -0.853 0.816 -0.212 0.716 -0.481 0.537 -0.566 0.149 1.000
high school 0.496 0.106 -0.548 -0.646 -0.057 0.893 -0.187 0.870 -0.723 -0.444 1.000
voc. Train 0.393 0.693 -0.363 0.764 -0.647 -0.227 -0.517 -0.112 0.327 -0.536 -0.383 1.000
university 0.536 0.783 -0.544 0.372 -0.630 0.113 -0.284 0.185 0.212 -0.828 0.076 0.451 1.000
human cap. 0.418 0.763 -0.483 0.527 -0.584 -0.054 -0.298 0.032 0.427 -0.737 -0.151 0.619 0.922 1.000
social cap. 0.589 0.421 -0.239 0.256 -0.615 0.116 -0.379 0.177 -0.081 -0.361 0.074 0.516 0.089 0.080 1.000
recovery1 0.222 -0.139 0.099 -0.538 0.035 0.344 0.237 0.318 -0.445 -0.036 0.498 -0.453 -0.051 -0.332 0.215 1.000
RGDP1 -0.023 -0.410 0.411 -0.582 0.298 0.146 0.393 0.098 -0.349 0.293 0.318 -0.592 -0.322 -0.517 0.007 0.892 1.000
Remploy1 0.452 0.124 -0.242 -0.406 -0.217 0.502 0.007 0.491 -0.502 -0.298 0.578 -0.254 0.150 -0.138 0.418 0.897 0.633 1.000
recovery2 0.625 0.153 -0.298 -0.437 -0.355 0.643 -0.182 0.617 -0.643 -0.391 0.732 -0.212 0.112 -0.158 0.500 0.703 0.489 0.790 1.000
RGDP2 0.359 0.158 -0.191 -0.085 -0.395 0.223 0.008 0.182 -0.367 -0.388 0.356 -0.064 0.378 0.087 0.386 0.551 0.250 0.689 0.746 1.000
Remploy2 0.553 0.053 -0.227 -0.470 -0.283 0.620 -0.154 0.586 -0.627 -0.274 0.706 -0.263 -0.025 -0.246 0.526 0.702 0.534 0.772 0.974 0.664 1.000
recovery3 0.266 0.560 -0.021 0.476 -0.405 -0.292 -0.157 -0.156 0.490 -0.296 -0.430 0.623 0.421 0.469 0.336 0.011 -0.070 0.017 -0.195 -0.102 -0.258 1.000
RGDP3 0.311 0.745 -0.266 0.715 -0.622 -0.241 -0.493 -0.112 0.550 -0.433 -0.454 0.790 0.539 0.658 0.279 -0.420 -0.573 -0.279 -0.336 -0.158 -0.408 0.787 1.000
Remploy3 0.300 0.338 -0.154 0.023 -0.234 0.068 0.048 0.159 -0.041 -0.365 0.049 0.336 0.294 0.275 0.363 0.365 0.247 0.400 0.135 0.087 0.109 0.553 0.172 1.000
recovery4 0.325 -0.050 -0.430 -0.569 -0.025 0.728 -0.074 0.689 -0.671 -0.107 0.653 -0.461 -0.084 -0.312 0.036 0.516 0.333 0.647 0.531 0.332 0.523 -0.360 -0.378 0.004 1.000
RGDP4 0.210 0.013 -0.259 -0.124 -0.009 0.278 -0.136 0.268 -0.649 -0.105 0.424 -0.340 0.048 -0.188 -0.133 0.390 0.287 0.458 0.279 0.315 0.219 -0.322 -0.389 0.133 0.636 1.000
Remploy4 0.311 -0.036 -0.290 -0.628 -0.076 0.703 -0.014 0.657 -0.322 -0.082 0.528 -0.366 -0.084 -0.208 0.092 0.391 0.268 0.464 0.479 0.169 0.491 -0.251 -0.191 -0.129 0.794 0.116 1.000
crisis1 0.025 0.142 0.030 -0.082 -0.193 0.143 -0.160 0.130 0.148 -0.073 0.016 0.164 -0.040 0.004 0.042 -0.328 -0.281 -0.362 -0.004 -0.149 -0.036 0.070 0.209 -0.074 -0.303 -0.507 -0.003 1.000
CGDP1 0.172 0.219 -0.163 -0.315 -0.280 0.412 -0.049 0.404 0.008 -0.195 0.239 -0.045 0.136 0.038 0.054 0.199 0.064 0.186 0.152 0.063 0.102 0.178 0.236 0.195 0.324 -0.086 0.547 0.521 1.000
Cemploy1 -0.064 0.140 0.207 0.138 -0.092 -0.152 -0.142 -0.134 0.336 0.022 -0.197 0.234 -0.046 0.044 -0.018 -0.424 -0.270 -0.513 -0.202 -0.311 -0.231 0.208 0.253 -0.061 -0.566 -0.502 -0.328 0.888 0.212 1.000
crisis2 -0.204 -0.096 0.434 -0.136 0.215 -0.274 0.461 -0.284 0.386 0.105 -0.246 -0.066 0.142 0.115 -0.220 0.124 0.231 -0.065 -0.104 -0.054 -0.181 0.382 0.065 0.209 -0.477 -0.408 -0.243 0.255 0.031 0.370 1.000
CGDP2 -0.322 -0.408 0.422 -0.567 0.399 0.031 0.610 -0.074 0.089 0.287 0.094 -0.565 -0.092 -0.197 -0.293 0.478 0.562 0.313 0.149 0.128 0.166 -0.117 -0.439 0.070 -0.022 -0.163 0.130 0.050 0.134 0.014 0.686 1.000
Cemploy2 -0.033 0.226 0.167 0.128 0.046 -0.237 0.111 -0.174 0.513 -0.160 -0.226 0.206 0.344 0.401 -0.310 -0.250 -0.158 -0.401 -0.329 -0.333 -0.446 0.453 0.402 0.096 -0.544 -0.392 -0.251 0.328 0.096 0.481 0.758 0.197 1.000
crisis3 0.406 0.193 -0.396 -0.539 -0.172 0.705 -0.068 0.701 -0.527 -0.374 0.670 -0.228 0.162 -0.145 0.120 0.686 0.440 0.739 0.625 0.470 0.539 0.092 -0.115 0.298 0.666 0.353 0.545 0.091 0.568 -0.139 0.009 0.226 -0.144 1.000
CGDP3 0.403 0.188 -0.355 -0.531 -0.191 0.681 -0.060 0.672 -0.508 -0.363 0.650 -0.215 0.154 -0.152 0.142 0.707 0.469 0.744 0.633 0.482 0.548 0.101 -0.111 0.306 0.641 0.331 0.549 0.113 0.597 -0.120 0.034 0.251 -0.129 0.996 1.000
Cemploy3 0.598 0.240 -0.438 -0.492 -0.186 0.801 -0.392 0.817 -0.495 -0.291 0.743 -0.209 -0.086 -0.224 0.268 0.317 0.252 0.379 0.591 0.025 0.595 -0.083 -0.155 0.016 0.491 0.126 0.520 0.307 0.321 0.195 -0.154 -0.009 -0.106 0.581 0.562 1.000
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Sensitivity Analysis 
MFA of resilience in the Spanish regions according to Sánchez (2012) periods 
(1977-2015) 
The MFA is conducted as in section 3.3.2.1 to explore whether the results vary if other 
time periods are considered (Table A3.4). In this case we consider Sánchez (2012) 
periods. 
Table A3.4: Periods for the analysis 
 
The complete dataset for the 17 Spanish regions comprises 3 different resilience 
indicators measured over six consecutive periods and 13 supplementary variables. The 
MFA of the three resilience tables provided the first two factors, which explain more 
than the 50% of the total variance in the table (the first 37.64% and the second 20.78%). 
Comparative analysis of the three resilience measurement methods is conducted 
using the RV coefficients (Table A3.5) and the variables graph (Figure A3.1). The RV 
values reveal a shared common structure between the 3 tables, which is more obvious 
between our resilience index and the remaining two. 
Table A3.5: RV relation coefficients between indexes       
 
The detected common structure is supported by the fact that the resilience indicators 
point roughly in the same direction for each period. Thus, the three resilience indicators 
of period 4 point to left in the variable graph (Figure A3.1) any similarly occurs in the 
Period 1 Crisis 1977-1985
Period 2 Recovery 1986-1990
Period 3 Crisis 1991-1994
Period 4 Recovery 1995-2006
Period 5 Crisis 2007-2011
Period 6 Recovery 2012-2015
Our resilience index Martin's GDP index Martin's employment index
Our resilience index 1.000
Martin's GDP index 0.746 1.000
Martin's employment index 0.744 0.431 1.000
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rest of periods except 1 and 3. It should be noted that employment resilience indicators 
in periods 1 and 3 are quite far from the two remaining indicators (composite and GDP). 
This feature reflects that the common structure between the 3 tables is less obvious; 
suggesting that in these periods the three methods will yield clearly distinct resilience 
scores for the Spanish regions.  
The second issue, the analysis of the structure of relationship between resilience 
indicators and supplementary variables, is addressed by again giving meaning to the two 
factors using the variables graph (Figure A3.1). 
The first is an opposition factor, that is to say, it opposes the resilience indicators of 
period 5, which represents the last crisis, 2007-2011, with those of the remaining 
periods considered, mainly those of recovery, 2, 4 and 6. Therefore, regions that have 
positive (negative) scores on factor 1 are more (less) resilient than the mean in period 5 
and, in general, less (more) resilient in the above-mentioned recovery periods. Note that 
regions with scores close to zero may either be around the mean for resilience in all 
these periods or above the mean but experiencing a compensation effect. 
The second is also an opposition factor since the resilience indicators of recovery 
period 2 oppose those of crisis periods 1 and 3. Therefore, regions that have positive 
(negative) scores in factor 2 are more (less) resilient than the mean in period 2 and less 
(more) resilient periods 1 and 3. Note that regions with scores close to zero may 
experience a compensation effect like that of factor 1. 
The supplementary variables relating to the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
regions are projected onto the variables graph (Figure A3.1, variables in black). The 
supplementary variables industry and public capital point clearly towards the right, as 
do vocational training graduates and human capital, albeit more weakly. In 
consequence, these variables are positively correlated with indicators of resilience of 
crisis period 5. It is worth noting that public capital is highly correlated with the 
resilience indicators of period 5 and that industry is opposite to the resilience indicators 
of periods 6 and 4 (negatively correlated with them). Conversely, high school graduates, 
market services, production specialisation and social capital point to the left, and are 
therefore positively correlated with the resilience indicators of all recovery periods. 
High school graduates, market services, production specialisation points also towards 
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down so, there will be more intensely correlated with the resilience indicators of period 
6 and with the employment resilience indicators of periods 1 and 3. 
In consequence, regions with positive factor scores on factor 1 (more resilient than 
the mean in crisis period 5 and less in recovery periods) are above the mean in industry 
and social capital and below the mean in high school graduates, market services and 
productive specialisation. The most resilient regions in this period, 2007-2011, are 
characterised by an industry-centred productive structure and above-average public and 
human capital. Likewise, they are characterised by having a population with high 
percentage of vocational training graduates. 
And finally, in the recovery stages, we can say that the social capital variable, which 
points to the left, is associated with the recovery periods, especially period 2. The 
association is positive but not very strong. Finally, the high school graduates, market 
services and productive specialisation variables show a positive association with the 
recovery indicators, as shown by their position in the plane, especially in period 6. The 
opposition of the industry variable to the variables just mentioned is striking. This 
implies that industry share in the economy negatively correlates with high school 
graduates, market services and productive specialisation, and then we expect a negative 
relationship of industry with the recovery variables especially those of period 6. 
Therefore, we could say that the most resilient regions in the recovery periods are those 
that stand out for their specialisation in market services, for their share of the population 
a high school education, and above-average social capital. The share of industry in their 
economies, in contrast, is barely significant. 
Now that the factors have a meaning, we are ready to address the final issue, the 
characterisation of the regions in terms of their resilience and how clearly they are 
reflected in the supplementary variables. To do this, each Spanish region is projected on 
the factorial plane 1-2 taking all the information relating to its resilience, that is, the 
global points of MFA are obtained (Figure A3.2). For the sake of brevity, the positions 
of only a few regions are commented on. 
According to the interpretation of Figure A3.2, the regions farther to the right in the 
plane will be those that are above average in terms of resilience in crisis period 5. If we 
look at Tables 2 and 3 which show the indicators of resilience, we observe that País 
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Vasco, Navarra, La Rioja and Aragón are the ones that behave best in that period. The 
cases of Navarra and Aragón are peculiar since they are located in the middle of the 
global point graph. This may be due to the compensation effect noted above. Navarra is 
one of the regions that are best placed in period 5 but it also remains around the mean in 
the rest of the periods. This is why its position has remained centred on the plane. 
Aragón behaves very well in crisis period 5 but also in the last recovery period (6); it 
therefore occupies an intermediate position on the plane. In times of crisis, País Vasco 
stands out for its greater resilience. It is an industry-centred region with a greater 
endowment of public and human capital and also has the highest percentage of people 
with vocational training.  
As we have already explained, the factors are of opposition, which explains the 
situation of Valencia on the left side of the plane since it is the worst performer in 
period 5 and the best in recovery period 6, in opposition to the País Vasco. 
A look at crisis periods 1 and 3 shows that the indicators point downwards towards 
the left. That quadrant contains the regions of Baleares and Canarias, which perform 
best in terms of resilience during these crisis periods. The most resilient regions in crisis 
periods 1 and 3, Baleares and Canarias, stand out for having above-average productive 
specialisation, and in particular, a strong economic focus on market services, as shown 
in Figure A3.1. They also stand out for having an above-average percentage of high 
school graduates.  
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Figure A3.1: Variables plotted on the factorial plane (1-2) 
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Figure A3.2: Global points on the factorial plane (1-2)  
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Directions for Future Research 
 
Given that the results and conclusions of the three studies carried out in this thesis are 
provided at the end of each chapter, this section reviews possible extensions of the work 
performed here. What follows, therefore, are some brief remarks on different possible 
lines for future research. 
 
1. New decentralization measures 
In chapters 1 and 2 the means used to quantify the degree of fiscal decentralization of 
the OECD countries are the subnational share of total public expenditure and the 
subnational share of total government tax revenue (Government Finance Statistics, 
IMF). Both these fiscal decentralization measures are widely used in the literature 
(Oates, 1985, 1993; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and Phillips, 1998; Thieben, 2003; 
Iimi, 2005) and are considered by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2006) as the most 
appropriate of all those available, in the absence of reliable alternatives. They have, 
nevertheless, been criticised for not measuring the degree of autonomy in regional 
government expenditure, and failing to make a distinction between tax- and non-tax 
revenue (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003; Rodden, 2004; Stegarescu, 2005). 
The literature has also proposed various non-fiscal measures to account for the 
multiple aspects of decentralization (Kaufman, 1963; Stephens, 1974; Smith, 1979; 
Bahl, 1999; and Treisman, 2002, provide comprehensive discussions of the factors that 
together describe the extent of fiscal decentralization). The ratio of sub-central 
government employment to total government employment (Arikan, 2004), the 
population-normalised number of sub-central jurisdictions (Oates, 1985) and even the 
number of tiers of sub-central government are just a few of the many alternatives that 
have, at one time or another, been used to measure decentralization. Generally speaking, 
despite the additional information that may be obtained, the comparison of employment 
figures or the number of government tiers or sub-central jurisdictions without 
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accounting for differences in statutes and degrees of autonomy across countries can be 
expected to present problems.  
In view of these difficulties, a few approaches aim at improving the measurement of 
fiscal decentralization by taking into account the vertical decision-making structures, 
particularly with respect to tax revenues
16
. Among these, the most comprehensive effort 
was made by the OECD, which provided a methodological framework for the 
classification of subnational tax revenues by degree of tax autonomy. Detailed figures 
are reported for a number of OECD and EU accession countries, though only for 1995-
97
17
. Both the OECD study and Ebel and Yilmaz (2003), who used these data, use a 
definition of fiscal decentralization based exclusively on the degree of subnational tax 
autonomy, i.e. the ratio of own tax revenue controlled by sub-central governments to 
total subnational revenue. This measure does not account for the relative size of sub-
central government, however. 
Using the OECD classification of tax autonomy, Stegarescu (2005) provides 
measures of tax and revenue decentralization, thereby relating autonomous subnational 
government tax revenue to total central government tax revenue. However, the analysis 
of fiscal decentralization could analogously be extended to classify subnational 
expenditure or borrowing by degree of autonomy, drawing, for example, on the 
classifications proposed by the Council of Europe (1997) or the World Bank 
Decentralization Project. This approach would involve breaking down sub-central 
government expenditure by function and degree of local legislative and executive 
discretion.  
                                                     
16 Pola (1999), for example, provides figures on the degree of self-financing by local and regional 
governments in 15 EU countries, distinguishing between different types of taxes. Blankart (2000) 
compares Germany and Switzerland using the share of general government tax revenue that is determined 
by central government legislation as a measure of fiscal centralization. Some attempts have also been 
made to classify sub-central government functions according to the degree of discretion; see, for example, 
Owens and Norregaard (1991) and Pola (1999) for European countries. However, no corresponding 
figures on fiscal decentralization are reported there. 
17 See OECD (1999). Based on a joint initiative with the World Bank and the Council of Europe, among 
others, the OECD has, since 2000, carried out surveys on the design of fiscal systems across levels of 
government for a group of countries. The first results were presented for six EU accession countries; see 
OECD (2002a and 2002b). 
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Hooghe et al. (2010, 2016) also elaborate a regional authority index for several 
developed and developing countries. This index covers a broad range of aspects of 
decentralization, including fiscal autonomy, representation, executive power, policy 
scope, etc. 
In consequence, further work is needed to find better decentralization indicators to 
capture with accuracy the multidimensional nature of the devolution of power and 
resources from central to subnational tiers of government. 
 
2. Transmission mechanisms of decentralization on technical 
efficiency and shadow economy  
One important contribution to the decentralization literature will be an empirical 
analysis of the transmission mechanisms that account for the effect of decentralization 
on technical efficiency and shadow economy. This thesis studies the effects of 
decentralization on these issues but does not fully explore the transmission mechanisms.  
The theoretical literature on fiscal federalism identifies two benchmark channels 
through which fiscal decentralization is expected to affect efficiency positively, namely 
(i) increased electoral control and (ii) yardstick competition among local governments 
resulting from decentralization. According to the electoral control mechanism, 
decentralization reduces the inclination of officials to divert rents and increases the 
probability of ―bad‖ incumbents being voted out of office, thus positively affecting 
overall government efficiency (Hindriks and Lockwood 2009). Moreover, Seabright 
(1996) shows that rent-seeking politicians, when running in decentralised elections, use 
incentives to lure the voters in each (local) constituency. To get re-elected in a national 
election, in contrast, politicians would seek to please the voters only in a majority of the 
localities. Similar results are obtained by Myerson (2006) and Hindriks and Lockwood 
(2009). According to the theory of yardstick competition (see e.g., Shleifer 1985; 
Besley and Case 1995), citizens are at an advantage when they are able to evaluate the 
performance of their policy makers by comparing the policy choices of their own 
political representatives with those of the policy makers in neighbouring regions. 
Therefore, fiscal decentralization may increase efficiency, as it offers citizens an 
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opportunity to compare public services and taxes across jurisdictions and helps them to 
assess whether their government wastes resources through low human capital capacity 
or rent-seeking (Besley and Smart 2007). 
With respect to the impact of the transmission mechanisms of decentralization on 
shadow economy, enhanced efficiency in decentralised systems increases acceptance of 
state interventions as well as tax morale (Torgler et al., 2010) and may, thereby, reduce 
the size of the shadow economy (efficiency effect). The closer the distance between 
bureaucrats and economic agents and/or the greater the frequency of face-to-face 
contact, the higher the probability of workers in the shadow economy being discovered 
and the lower the expected gains from informality (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). 
Decentralization increases the effectiveness of surveillance and should thereby reduce 
the size of the shadow economy (deterrence effect).  
The idea for the future will be to study the transmission mechanisms through which 
decentralization affects technical efficiency or shadow economy.  
 
3. New methods to analyse the relationship between 
decentralization and efficiency;  and decentralization and 
shadow economy 
In chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, an econometric model with panel data is used to 
analyse the relationship between decentralization and efficiency (chapter 1) and 
decentralization and shadow economy (chapter 2). The idea, for future research, will be 
to analyze these relationships using a Bayesian model averaging approach (BMA).  
Standard statistical practice ignores model uncertainty. Data analysts typically select 
a model from some class of models and then proceed as though the selected model had 
generated the data. This approach ignores the uncertainty in model selection, leading to 
over-confident inferences and decisions that are more risky than might appear. BMA 
provides a coherent mechanism for accounting for this model uncertainty (Hoeting et 
al., 1999). 
The idea is to declare a priori that the ―true‖ model is unknown, which implies a 
departure from the classical methodology in which conditioning on a specified model is 
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essential. Consequently, instead of traditional conditioning, the employed Bayesian 
inference attaches prior non-informative beliefs to the model parameters (i.e., 
coefficients and error variance). In the next-averaging-step, the (unconditional) 
estimator is computed as a weighted average on these conditional estimators (Asatryan 
and Feld, 2015).  
 
4. New samples to analyse the relationship between 
decentralization and efficiency;  and decentralization and 
shadow economy 
The relationships between decentralization and efficiency and decentralization and 
shadow economy will be analysed using different samples of countries. Chapters one 
and two consider OECD countries, but it would be interesting to do the same with a 
sample of developing countries. This will enable comparison of the results to see 
whether decentralization has the same effects in developed countries as in developing 
ones.  
 
5. Possibility of including additional supplementary variables in 
resilience analysis 
Chapter three of the thesis analyses the determinants of Spanish regional resilience 
focusing on productive structure and public, human and social capital. Given the limited 
number of Spanish regions (17), however, it will be interesting to extend the analysis to 
other European regions. It will also be worth considering other variables that might 
influence regional resilience. In particular, what factors enable a region to adjust and 
adapt over time? The answer is likely to lie in a number of areas, with the relevant 
importance of each factor being different across regions and over time, but the sort of 
factors that appear to have been helpful in the past would include: a strong regional 
system of innovation (Clark et al., 2010; Howells, 1999); strength in factors that create a 
‗learning region‘ (Archibugi and Lundvall, 2001); a modern productive infrastructure 
(transport, broadband provision, etc.); a skilled, innovative and entrepreneurial 
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workforce; a supportive financial system providing patient capital; a diversified 
economic base, not over-reliant on a single industry. Others that might be included are 
variables relating to regional demographics, regional innovation, regional knowledge 
systems, regional dynamism, institutional arrangements, macroeconomic and financial 
indicators, fiscal policy indicators, labour market institutions or socio-cultural 
indicators. 
Having collected all the data for European regions, the next stage will be to analyse 
whether these variables have any impact on resilience and identify the most suitable 
econometric model to reveal the positive and negative effects and their significance.  
Chapter three describes an exploratory analysis of factors that may influence 
resilience. So here the idea will be to further this analysis and determine whether the 
results obtained by MFA are robust with econometric results.  
 
6. Spatial resilience 
Another possibility when studying resilience is to consider the concept of ―spatial 
resilience‖. This concept has its roots in meetings and discussions of the Resilience 
Alliance (http://www.resalliance.org), an international consortium of researchers and 
practitioners with interests in developing and applying resilience-related concepts in the 
context of social-ecological sustainability. Its first published usage was by Nystrom and 
Folke (2001), but it has taken on a broader meaning in subsequent discussions. A 
comprehensive definition is offered in the first book-length treatment of spatial 
resilience (Cumming 2011): 
―Spatial resilience‖ refers to the ways in which spatial variation in relevant variables, 
both inside and outside the system of interest, influences (and is influenced by) system 
resilience across multiple spatial and temporal scales. It has elements that are both 
internal and external to the system.  
The primary internal elements of spatial resilience include the spatial arrangement of 
system components and interactions; spatially relevant system properties, such as 
system size, shape, and the number and nature of system boundaries (e.g., hard or soft, 
and whether temporally variable or fixed over time scales of interest); spatial variation 
 
 
142 
 
in internal phases, such as the successional phase, that influence resilience; and unique 
system properties that are a function of location in space.  
The primary external elements of spatial resilience include context (spatial 
surroundings, defined at the scale of analysis); connectivity (including spatial 
compartmentalisation or modularity); and resulting spatial dynamics, such as spatially- 
driven feedbacks and spatial subsidies. 
Both internal and external elements must be considered in relation to other aspects of 
system resilience, including such things as the number and nature of components and 
interactions, the ability of the system to undergo change while maintaining its identity, 
system memory, and the potential inherent in the system for adaptation and learning‖. 
In many social systems, system size is fundamental to overall resilience. The 
probability of extinction, or localised component loss, correlates with habitat and 
population size, with larger areas and populations usually being more resilient (Holt, 
1992; Bruhl et al., 2003).  
An example of the study of spatial resilience of Spanish regions is the paper by 
Angulo et al. (2014), which uses predictions from spatial panel data models to evaluate 
regional resilience to the last crisis that affected Spain using annual employment growth 
rates.  
Thus, one future line of research will be to introduce geographical data into 
resilience analysis, to take into account this concept of spatial resilience, while 
extending the sample periods and broadening the scope of the analysis to include 
European regions. 
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